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Terms and Abbreviations  
 
Campesino…………………..peasant farmer, of either mestizo or indigenous 
descent 
Caracol………………………government centers for the Zapatisa 
Autonomous Municipalities 
Consulta……………………..a deliberative meeting to discuss major 
community issues and bring them to a vote  
CCRI……………………….Clandestine Revolutionary Committee 
Ejido………………………..communal land granted by the Mexican 
governent 
JBG…………………………Junta of Good Government 
MAREZ…………………….Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities in 
Rebellion 
Mestizo……………………...People of both Spanish and Indigenous descent 
(Mayan, Aztec)  
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Abstract 
By subscribing to the "New World order" , Mexico embarked on a path which would change the destiny of Mexican 
citizens for ever.  On the one hand, neoliberalism with its emphasis on free markets and free trade accelerated the 
deterioration of life and increased inequality among Mexican citizens, fueling social movements that had been going on 
for decades before. On the other hand the emergence of a liberal democracy, with its rhetorical emphasis on human 
rights protection, democratization,and good governance opened a window of opportunity for these newly invigorated 
social movements that have been oppressed in Mexico through militarization an an authoritarian regime.  A now more 
image conscious Mexican government is concerned about its ability to attract foreign capital to pay back its external 
debt . As it stands, the road is open for genuine democratization in Mexico, however the path is not going to be through 
artificially imposed representation structures and free markets.  This is not a viable system for the future of Mexico or 
its indigenous citizens. The Zapatistas self-governance practices can teach important lessons about democracy, and 
alternatives to a failing liberal democracy model. 
 
The Zapatistas: Redefining Democracy  
 
According to Michael Lowy and Frei Betto, "representative democracy... is 
necessary, yet insufficient.  What we need are superior, more participatory forms 
of democracy that allow the population to exercise directly their power to decide 
and to oversee...(2003: 335)" Currently, representative democracy takes the form 
of either parliamentarianism or presidentialism (top to bottom rule), neither of 
which adequately address the concerns, needs, and wants of a pluricultural society 
(Parameswaran 2003; Lowy and Betto 2003).  It is especially the most vulnerable 
sectors of society who lack representation in these 'representative' systems 
(Mindiola 2006).  
 In Latin America, indigenous populations are typically the most 
marginalized and receive even less representation than other groups. Thus they are 
often those who benefit the least from representative democracy. Marginalization 
deepens with the deterioration of state sovereignty, an effect of an increased 
interdependence on international financial institutions. These very same 
institutions are the driving force behind economic globalization (of which 
neoliberalism is a huge dimension) that puts the interests of the many into the 
hands of the few (Parameswaran 2003:324; Mindiola 2006). 
  Indigenous populations  are often only of interest to global capital "because 
of the resources in their territories or the genetic properties of the plants, animals, 
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and even their own bodies in the biospheres of which they are the custodians" ( 
Nash 2001: 2).   Living in extreme poverty, and often under military pressure, 
peoples in Latin America are finding fewer and fewer options for survival  and are 
forced to find new alternatives to the existing system which exploits them ( Nash 
2001).   Attempts of indigenous people to expand their range of collective and 
individual autonomy offer the most innovative response to the loss of self-
determination, often posed as an "inevitable consequence of [economic] 
globalization"( Nash 2001: 2)   
 This virtual exclusion and exploitation has also led many groups in Latin 
America to take up arms or join passive resistant social movements. One such 
social movement which is trying to address these issues of loss of self-
determination, exploitation, and lack of representation in both local and national 
politics is the new Zapatista movement in Mexico.  The Zapatista Army of  
National Liberation (EZLN), made up of primarily poor indigenous peasant 
farmers or campesinos, speak out for democratic alternatives to neoliberalism 
(liberal democracy and a free-market economy) which they classify as “a new war 
of conquest for territories […which] is a strange modernity that moves forward by 
going backward.”( Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos 1997). 
 The Zapatistas gained international recognition in 1994 when they took up 
arms and seized several municipalities in Chiapas, the southernmost state of 
Mexico, declaring war on the government.  After a year of unsuccessful 
negotiations with a national government,  Zapatistas gave up hope of any real 
progress in dealing with the state (EZLN Jan.2006).  In 1994 the first of four 
"Aguascalientes" was built to provide a space for dialogue and negotiation and to 
house a de facto rebel government,the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous 
Committees (CCRI). In 1995 the EZLN began to organize “autonomous projects” 
first in the areas of strongest Zapatista control, and continued to expand. The 
 6
Zapatistas originally started the projects to afford communities with a local 
democratic government, based on general assemblies and consensus voting, 
something indigenous people were denied under the local state government 
(Collier 2005; Nash 2001).  
 The  most recent Zapatista development has been the organization of fully 
self-governing or autonomous municipalities within the state of Chiapas.  In 2003, 
the Zapatistas established the Juntas of Good Government (JBG)  in order to 
mediate affairs within and between municipalities and promote productive projects 
in collaboration with national and international civil society (Collier 2005:196; 
JBG March 2006). The JBG’s are of special interest because they have completely 
redefined the West’s notion of a democracy 'of the people, by the people for the 
people'. The structure and vision of the JBG based on 'governing by obeying' and 
'learning by governing' is fascinating and inspiring to say the least.  
 All election processes are from the bottom up, and the Junta of Good 
Government govern under the philosophy of 'governing by obeying', where 
government officials are at the benevolence of their constituencies. There are no 
professional leaders, the structure is non-hierarchical, and it is a  participatory 
democracy which aims to address the needs and concerns of the people (JBG 
March 2006). 
 This new addition to Zapatista government redefine democracy by creating 
a balance between both representative and direct democracy. Their model based 
on consocial participatory democracy seems to allow citizens considerable control 
over political decisions, while at the same time not losing the effiency of more 
rigid systems like presidentialism or parliamentarianism (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997; Linz and Valenzuela 1994) 
 This new addition to Zapatista government redefine democracy by creating 
a balance between both representative and direct democracy. Their model based 
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on consocial participatory democracy seems to allow citizens considerable control 
over economic and sociopolitical decisions, while at the same time not losing the 
effiency of more rigid systems like presidentialism or parliamentarianism 
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Linz and Valenzuela 1994).  
 
Problem 
The development of the Zapatista movement had been happening parallel to the 
emergence of a new liberal democracy in Mexico (Peeler 1998; Harvey 1998). 
The transition from an authoritarian regime to liberal democracy, and hope for 
genuine democratization in Mexico began roughly when the PRI hegemony of 
over 70 years was defeated in 2000 by Vicente Fox of the opposition party 
National Action Party (PAN). This breakthrough was seen as a path in the right 
direction  towards democratization in Mexico, after a long history of corruption 
and abuse of the representative electoral system (Bartra and Otero 2001).   
 Unfortunately, the material situations of Mexican citizens have not 
improved since the introduction of liberal democracy.  In fact, the lives of many 
Mexican citizens are actually worse off than they were under the PRI due to 
Mexico's neoliberal economic policies (Stephen 2002; Sanders 2001).  
 Indigenous and poor mestizo farmers' demands for inclusion in major socio 
political decisions are still largely ignored by the state and national governments, 
reinforcing the marginalization and social tension of these groups (Hogenboom 
2004; Mindiola 2006).  
 
Question 
In the isolated regions of Chiapas, the Zapatista movement seems to be working to 
promote a system where people have the ability to directly exerise their power to 
decide and oversee, as well as assuming the role of primary social provisionary for 
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their autonomous citizens. Essentially they have created a social democracy in an 
area experiencing extreme poverty, prone to internal divisions and violence, and 
deemed to be ungovernable by the state. The Zapatista movement seems to offor 
insights into solving many of the problems that Mexico's emerging liberal 
democracy and Presidential system has failed to address. Currently, the benefits of 
the Zapatista system are felt exclusively within their limited zones of influence. 
But what implications does their model have for other situations? This paper 
proposes the following theoretical questions:  
1. Can the Zapatista government model be adapted for use on the state level, 
national, and international levels? Can their model be adapted to other societies 
and cultures? 2. Is the Zapatista model a more viable alternative to achieve social 
democracy than liberal democracy? 
  
Structure of Paper  
The next chapter, Chapter 1, gives a brief theoretical discussion on different 
approaches to, and origins of democracy, and the role in which economic 
globalization and good governance play in democracy today.  In chapter 2, the 
methodological choices for conducting research are outlined and explained. 
Findings  regarding governmental structures, voting practices, and the different 
functions which the autonomous municipalities take up in order to give better 
insight into their unique governmental practices are presented.  Chapter 3 
discusses in brief the factors which have contributed to Mexico's political culture  
and the relationship between indigenous people in the Mexican state from a 
historical perspective.  Focus will then turn towards marginalization of indigenous 
people in Mexico and Latin America in general, indigenous autonomy, and the 
effects of neoliberalism in Mexico.  Chapter 4 gives an overview of the Zapatista 
uprising and the factors which contributed to its occurrence. Chapter 6 discusses in 
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brief the New Zapatista Movement. Chapter 6 presents different arguments on the 
failures of liberal democracy and presidential democracy. Chapter 7 discusses the 
implications for alternative systems. Delegative democracy is considered a 
possible alternative and the Zapatista model is compared and contrasted to 
delegative democracy in order to determine whether the theory can work in 
practice. Chapter 8 begins with a discussion of different criticisms towards the 
Zapatista de facto autonomies, and self-governance. And finally,  Chapter 9 
provides conclusions.  
 
CHAPTER 1 THEORY 
1.1 The Roots of Democracy  
Defining democracy is not an easy task in itself, as it has been interpreted and 
defined in many different ways and has been adapted throughout the different eras 
of history.  Although several definitions and interpretations exist, central to the 
concept is the rule of "the people."  
 The modern idea and practice of a government of "the people" by the 
people, has its roots in ancient Greece, and they were the first to coin the term 
democracy, demos meaning  people and kratos meaning rule.  The ancient Greeks 
defined democracy as a "constitution in which the poor  masses of the population, 
the demos "ruled" over the rich minority (Peeler 1998:2).  The Greek 
interpretation of democracy is viewed by many democratic theorists as the historic 
"high point of the radical concept of democracy." (Peeler 1998: 2). By the 20th 
century, the idea of democracy was established as the "normal" form of 
government to which any nation is entitled (Sen 1999: 4).  
 
1.2 Types of Democracy 
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Direct Democracy  
Direct democracy allows everyone the opportunity to participate in making all 
policy decisions. It is termed direct because the power of making decisions is 
exercised by the people directly, without intermediaries or representatives.  
 Proponents of direct democracy hold  the view that citizens should 
participate directly, not through their representatives, in making laws and policies. 
Proponents offer varied reasons to support this view. For one, political activity can 
be valuable in itself, it socializes and educates citizens (Sen 1999). Most 
importantly, proponents point out that citizens do not really rule themselves unless 
they directly decide which laws and policies are to be implemented. In countries 
and large organizations, however, direct democracy is rarely used because it is 
often viewed as inefficient and cumbersome (Ford 2002).  
 There are very few examples of direct democracy, and perhaps the best 
example of direct democracy is the Athenian democracy in ancient Greece. 
The Athenian democracy (sometimes called classical democracy) was developed 
in fifth century Greece and it was one of the first known democracies.  As the 
Athens democracy was direct,  there were no elected representatives to vote on the 
people's behalf, nor were there political parties.  The people voted directly on 
executive bills and legislation themselves. They did have appointed officials, but 
they were not government representatives.  Participation was apparently not open 
to all Athens' citizens, as  the members of the assembly accounted for only about 
one-sixteenth of the total population of Athens ( Dowling 2001).   Greek society 
was highly stratified in terms of class, race, and gender, and there was a supposed 
natural superiority of males.  Approximately one in four people were slaves, which 
did not have the right to vote.  Women were not allowed to vote, and neither were 
foreigners, even if they were Greeks from other city-states (Hanson 1987; Ober 
1989).  Those who could participate in the Athens assembly were adult male 
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citizens over the age of 20, and it was considered a duty for them to do so. In 
Athens voters had to be physically present in order to vote (Peeler 1998).  
 
Representative Democracy 
In contrast to direct democracy, in a representative democracy, people vote to elect 
representatives in a “free and fair electoral system” to make policy for them under 
a wide range of "checks and balances" to help ensure “leadership accountability" 
(Lewis 2006: 1). Most democracies today comprise of some form a representative 
democracy either presidential or parliamentarian or a combination of the two 
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In a Presidential democracy, the chief executive 
(president) is popularly elected, and the terms of office of both the president and 
assembly are fixed.  In a Parliamentarian democracy, the chief executive (prime 
minister) is elected by parliament, and terms of office are not fixed, since the 
tenure of the prime minister and cabinet depends on the "competence" of the 
majority of the parliament, and sometimes, the cabinet may dissolve parliament 
and call early elections (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997:14) .  
  The majority of representative democracies are also liberal democracies, a 
form of representative democracy where the ability of elected representatives and 
the will of the majority exercise decision-making powers, is subject to the rule of 
law, and is  usually moderated by a constitution which emphasizes the protection 
of liberties, freedoms, and rights of the individual (McLean 1996).  Today, almost 
half of the world's population live in liberal democratic regimes (Freedom House 
2006)  
 The roots of liberal democracy can be traced to the idea of a social contract.  
The social contract  concepts arose after merchants and craft persons-in England, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were strong in resistance to state 
control of their enterprises and began to use contracts in their business dealings 
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which undermined the control of the state.  Contracts were very explicit in their 
terms, as opposed to custom and legal regulation (Peeler 1998: 6).  
 The theorists which represented the main channel of social contract thought 
were John Locke (Second Treatise on Government), from England, and Benedict 
de Spinoza from the Netherlands.  These theorists viewed the social contract as a 
"revocable agreement to set up a limited government to serve the interests of the 
parties to the contract, by protecting their natural rights"(Peeler 1998: 6). If those 
who were appointed to authority were to violate the contract's terms, they would 
be removed by those who appointed them to power (Peeler 1998).  Neither of 
these theorists abdicated the direct rule by the people, but instead rule by 
representatives (Peeler 1998). John Stuart Mill (2004), Considerations on 
Representative Government, considered to have been of great influence in the 
course of modern liberal democratic thought, also advocated representative over 
direct democracy (Li 1999).  
 Professor Robert Dahl (1989), argued that the theory of representative  
liberal democracy brought  democratic thought to a "completely new stage" 
because it  enabled a shift of the democratic stage from small city-states (as in 
ancient Greece)  to large nation-states. This change has been viewed by its 
proponents as a "desirable  solution to the competing needs of an  effective but 
also accountable  government" (Dahl in Li 1999: 1).  According to Dahl (1989: 30 
in Li 1999) however, the "institutions of democracy removed government so  far  
from the direct reach of the demos that one could reasonably  wonder, as some  
critics have, whether the new system was entitled  to call itself by the venerable 
name of democracy."  
 Dahl held the view that today's practice of representative liberal democracy 
is more like a polyarchy (rule by the many but not by all the people) which can be 
contrasted to other forms of government such as oligarchy (rule by the few), and 
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autocracy (rule by one), where political control is highly concentrated and not 
subject to control by the people (Peeler 1998:15). The concept of polyarchy is a 
system where voter participation is relatively high and power is relatively 
dispersed among "competing organized interests" (Peeler 1998:15).  A polyarchic 
regime has institutions that are "inclusive", thus giving scope for many citizens to 
influence government and "promoting responsiveness by governors"(Peeler 
1998:15).  Dahl's definition of polyarchy differs slightly to that of a liberal 
democracy, which puts more weight on limited state control and the rights of 
private property (Peeler 1999). 
Social contractarians, liberalists and neoliberalists alike believe that 
representative democracy is the only realistic democracy and although  citizens 
should have the "ultimate check on the business of the government,"  they  should 
not "actually run the government.  In their view, citizens should give political 
leaders the right to rule because in their view, citizens do not usually have clear 
views on issues or their views are not very intelligent (Locke in Peeler 1998; Mill 
2004; Schumpeter 1950; Ford 2002).  Both Mill (2004)  and Schumpeter (1950), 
for example, advocated unequal voting rights, giving educated people plural votes 
as a means of balancing the weight of the ignorant majority. According to Mill, 
more votes should be given to "wiser" and more "talented" citizens(Mill in Li 
1999:1). Mill's distrust of the general public's sentiment and judgment capacities is 
one important reason which led him to support a representative form of 
government where important public decisions are to be made by "qualified leaders 
with knowledge, expertise and wisdom" (  Li 1999: 1).  Both Mill and Schumpeter 
criticize the classical Athenian understanding of democracy, while Dahl held it to 
be "virtually unattainable" (Peeler 1998:15; Li 1999).  Mill believed that by having 
educated, professional leaders, without the interference of the general electorate, 
decisions would be better and the government will work more efficiently (Mill 
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2004).  
 Although democratic theorists such as Locke, Schumpeter and Mill paint a 
very positive picture of representative democracy,  when analyzing representative 
democracy theory, it is very important to take in account that the separation 
between who controls the government (theoretically the citizenship), and who runs 
the government (professional leaders) can create problems in itself.  
 If  the system of representative government remains unchecked and 
unbalanced, it has the tendency to result in the concentration of power (Li 1999). 
Theoretically, liberal institutions, a constitutional  state, and a system of checks 
and balances, disperse political  power across various interest groups and 
throughout the society in order to prevent this. In order to prevent the  formation 
of an "entrenched  class of self-serving elites", representative  democracy also 
needs  to create an array of egalitarian institutions to "ensure [...] equal opportunity 
for all,  and a  high degree of social mobility"(Li 1999:1).  Proponents of 
participatory democracy, which will be discussed below, take the issue of the 
emergence of a class of self-serving ruling elites to the heart of their argument. 
 
Participatory democracy 
According to Sen (1999: 10), who writes about democracy is a human value, 
"political freedom is a part of human freedom in general, and exercising civil and 
political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings. 
Political and social participation has intrinsic value for human life and well-being. 
To be prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major 
deprivation." Theorists like Mill (2004) thought also thought a key justification for 
democracy was that it provides a mechanism for the expansion of individual 
capacities and moral self-development, but claim that this need for participation 
can be fulfilled during the election process when the general public chooses their 
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representatives in the government (Mill 2004 ).  Proponents of participatory 
democracy however interpret participation in a different way. They believe that, 
regardless of the system, direct or representative, for a democracy to truly 
represent a government of the people by the people, it would require the greatest 
amount of participation from all members of society  where  "major 
socioeconomic choices [...]  are democratically discussed and decided upon by the 
population itself, and not by a handful of exploiters or their supposed market 
laws"(Lowy and Betto 2003: 335).   
 Parameswaran (2003: 325), who writes on participatory democracy asserts 
that participation has to be "creative." Though Paranaswaran does not give an 
exact definition of  ‘creative’, from the writings, I interpret the term as flexible, 
dynamic, "just", and that it promotes "sustainable development". Parameswaran 
(2003: 325) believes that if democracy is not creative, it will "only equate to mass 
slavery, to put it in strong words, or mass involvement in the execution of projects 
conceived by a very few, to put it mildly." 
 Participation must be universal and not limited to only a few individuals. In 
order for people to actually participate "meaningfully"  however, both political and 
economic activities would need to be on a small enough scale, "on a human scale" 
(Paraneswaran 2003: 325). Thus, advocates of participatory democracy assert that 
participation demands political decentralization and devolution of power (Woodin 
and Lucas 2004 Parameswaran 2003 MacEwan 1999).  Power relations need to be 
reversed, and rule needs to be changed from top-bottom to bottom-top.  According 
to  Parameswaran, local community needs to be at the center of democratic 
institutions.  She describes it is thus: "[u]ltimate sovereignty" should be vested in 
the local community.  The power of larger ruling bodies should be agreed upon at 
the local level, and there should also be programs which educate and enable 
citizens to take up the responsibility of governing themselves (Paraneswaran 2003: 
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328) 
 Proponents of participatory democracy assert that democracy demands 
revolutionary changes in economics, ethics, in politics of the society in order to 
function (Parameswaran 2003; MacEwan 1999).  These revolutionary changes 
have to be brought about through processes which in themselves are "consonant 
with the changes desired."  In other words, democracy cannot be brought through 
dictatorship, nor can ethics be enhanced through corruption (Parameswaran 2003: 
326). 
 When considering participatory democracy, it is important to take into 
account  that participation requires that people have the ability, the willingness, 
and the "necessary knowledge and skills" to participate (Paraneswaran 2003: 325).  
A good majority of people in many countries, especially in Latin America, are 
historically conditioned to not participate .This lack of participation often stems 
from a practical inability to participate, as we will see in the discussion of Mexico 
(Bartra and Otero 2005).  
 When analyzing the participatory democracy ideology, one must also 
consider that there can be certain tensions underlying participation, such as who is 
involved , in the participation process, how, and on whose terms. According to 
White (2000),  
"[w] hile participation has the potential to challenge patterns of dominance, it may also be the means 
through which existing power relations are entrenched and reproduced. The arenas in which people 
perceive their interests and judge whether they can express them are not neutral. Participation may take 
place for a whole range of unfree reasons. It is important to see participation as a dynamic process, and to 
understand that its own form and function can become a focus for struggle (White 2000: 1)". 
 
Delegative Democracy 
Another subgroup of participatory democracy is called "delegative democracy," a 
type of deliberative democracy which according to Ford,  
"combines the best elements of direct and representative democracy by replacing artificially imposed 
representation structures with an adaptive structure founded on real personal and group trust relationships.  
Delegative democracy empowers individually and encourages widespread direct participation in 
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democratic organisation, without unduly burdening or disenfranchising those members who, members who, 
for lack of time, interest, or knowledge, would prefer to take a more passive role" (2002: 1). 
 
Ford's interpretation of  delegative democracy is not to be confused with  
O'Donnell's (1994) for lack of time, interest, or knowledge, would prefer to take a 
more passive role." (2002: 1)definition of delegative democracy, where the 
"delegate" is seen as the the chief executive in a presidential democracy.1) 
 In a delegative democracy, each member of the electorate is independently 
given the choice of participating actively in the organization by becoming a 
delegate, or participating passively by delegating their individual vote to a 
delegate.  Voters without the time or interest to play an active role are not forced 
to learn about and pay attention to distant candidates running for various 
specialized offices and representative bodies, or to study and think carefully about 
a long string of referenda in order to make "responsible and well-informed 
decisions".  Instead, passive participants merely need to know or know of a 
delegate who they feel they can trust to look out for their interests. Individuals are 
free to choose their delegates on whatever proximity they view is most important, 
whether it be geographic location, identity, economic situation or other common 
interests (Ford 2002: 2). 
 Another interesting feature of delegative democracy is that there are very 
low barriers to participation. For those citizens who would like to take a more 
active role in decision-making and influencing politics they are not forced to battle 
it out in highly competitive and expensive election campaigns. Authority is vested 
in the delegates themselves, and depending on their voting power (each delegate 
has a weighted power depending on how many people delegate their votes to 
them), different delegates can exercise their varying levels of “decision power.” 
Anyone meeting certain “basic qualifications” can become a delegate, and while 
delegates may compete with each other for the votes of the electorate, they do not 
win or lose seats in an election (Ford 2002: 3).   
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Becoming a delegate does not by itself confer any representative power, it 
only indicates a willingness to act on behalf of others and a commitment to play a 
direct rule in the operation of the organization and take responsibilities for 
decisions made. To maximize the chance that individual voters will be able to find 
delegates who they identify with closely and with whom they can interact directly, 
there should be no fixed limit on the total number of delegates and it should be 
easy for anyone to become a delegate if they want to (Ford 2002). 
  Delegative democracy allows for anonymity  in the voting and delegating 
process in order to avoid social pressures and coercion.  All "posts," made by 
individuals are private, both to other individuals and delegates.  Although privacy 
is respected, transparency is very important in the decision-making process in 
order to ensure accountability of delegates to their voters and to the community at 
large.  Thus, all formal deliberate decisions made by delegates must be 
public.Voters must be able to watch a delegates actions closely in order to 
determine whether a delegate is acting in their interest, and in the interest of the 
public (Ford 2002:4).   
 The inherent advantage in delegative democracy is that it embodies 
representation without exclusion. The primary power structures in a delegative 
democracy are bottom-up, where the citizenship has a choice to participate or 
delegate instead of being imposed upon by top-down fixed representative bodies. 
In addition, the system is very flexible.  Acording to Ford, delegative democracy 
can empower individuals to control their own level and "style" of participation 
(Ford 2002:3).  Delegates are free to determine their own level of participation in 
order to avoid becoming overwhelmed or overburdened. Delegates have the 
choice to participate in forums most closely related to or affecting them , while 
delegating or redelegating (the ability of a delegate to delegate their vote to 
another delegate) their vote to others they trust in other forums that they are not so 
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informed about or interested in.  Both voters and delegates are free to withdraw 
their vote from delegates at any time and designate them to another if they so wish 
(Ford 2002:6).  
 There are so of course some very important disadvantages to delegative 
democracy.  First of all, delegative democracy has the premise that anyone can 
participate as a delegate. This can lead to some problems in large organization and 
countries where the body of delegates could grow into the millions.   Such a large 
body of delegates could not hope to fit in a room, and even getting them all into 
one geographic location, or paying them all full-time salaries could be 
"prohibitively costly"(Ford 2002: 8) . 
  Another possible problem is internal corruption, and misrepresentation. 
Even though delegates may not wield tremendous power individually, the option 
of using that power in secrecy to make important decisions can "create an 
irresistible temptation to use it irresponsibly". Accumulated over a large number 
of “similarly minded delegates,” such  temptations could  have a substantial 
negative impact (Ford 2002:6). This is however less likely to arise in delegative as 
opposed to representative democracy, because if a voter is not satisfied with 
decisions that the delegate is making they can choose to delegate the vote to 
someone else. This in itself is a way to check delegates, because they know they 
can lose voting power at any time (Ford 200). 
 Because there's no way to limit the amount of voting power that one 
delegate can have, it is certain that disparities will emerge among the different 
delegates. However according to Ford, disparities in voter power is not a problem 
provided they "adequately represent" the will of the people (Ford 2002: 3).   
 
1.3 Economic Globalization and Neoliberalism 
Globalization can be described as "…a widening, deepening and spreading of 
 20
worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the 
cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual" (Held et.al 1999: 2). 
Economic globalization can be defined as "the greater global interconnectedness 
of the modern world" (Woodin and Lucas 2004: 6).  The definition can also been 
adapted to include the interconnectedness of livelihoods, and of the production of 
goods and services (Held et.al 1999).   
 Woodin and Lucas (2004) take their definition of economic globalization 
straight from economic trade theory, which defines economic globalization as "the 
ever increasing integration of national economies into a giant one-size-fits-all 
global economy through trade and investment rules and privatization, aided by 
technological advances, and driven by corporate power" (Woodin and Lucas 2004: 
6). This seems a more realistic definition than simply the "global 
interconnectedness of the modern world," which leaves out the fact that economic 
globalization has little to do with such world values as democracy (see Sen 1999) 
or the protection of human rights (Woodin and Lucas 2004: 6).  Quite to the 
contrary of the "cozy" (Woodin and Lucas 2004: 6) definition as a 
"interconnectedness of the modern world," Vadi (2001: 129) believes that the 
strategic goal of economic globalization is to "maximize profits by penetrating 
economies and appropriating their human and natural resources in order to exploit 
them more fully and to incorporate them into the ambit of global capitalist 
relations". I share this view. 
 The global financial market has established a link between all other market 
processes where, through economic globalization, national governments end up 
with increasingly less control over their economic policy (Demmers et.al 2004; 
Shutt 2001).  Economic globalization is primarily enforced by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, which are the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The "tactical dimension of economic 
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globalization is neoliberalism [my emphasis], an operational set of policies” 
designed to meet “strategic objectives" which include privatizing state-owned 
enterprises, tariff reductions, eliminating barriers to foreign investment, reducing 
social provision, currency devaluation, centralizing decision-making, and market 
orientation (Vadi 2001: 129). Neoliberalism argues that free markets, free trade, 
and the unimpeded flow of capital will produce the greatest social, political and 
economic good (Korten 2001).  Neoliberalists argue for decreased government 
control in business affairs, saying that too much state control inhibits the market 
and thus civil liberties (MacEwan 1999).  
 Another feature of neoliberalism is that it measures everything in economic 
growth.  Countries, not individuals or groups of people, are the units of analysis, 
and little to "no attention is given" to how the benefits from neoliberalist policies 
are distributed among people within a country (MacEwan 1999: 31) This has led 
some critics to doubt the viability of neoliberal theory.  According to MacEwan,  
neoliberal claims "are but crude myths, having only a vague connection to reality, 
[...] once social and political considerations are allowed to override the market, the 
whole neoliberal position disintegrates"(MacEwan 1999: 35).  
  
Democracy and Neoliberalism 
 The neoliberal promotion of democracy has reduced (both theoretically and 
politically) the roles of the main intermediaries of political representation, political 
struggle and true consensus building. This has led to a loss of sovereignty and 
state power, where neoliberal institutions continuously gain control of world 
financial and political systems. According to Demmers" it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to legitimately incorporate other values, interests and goals 
in the policymaking process than those fitting within neoliberal parameters 
(Demmers et.al 2004: 11). The United States, a primary influence in the policy 
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decisions of the Bretton Woods institutions, "routinely forces" elected 
governments in the third world (often through the IMF) to abandon election 
commitments which are "not continual to Washington", while at the same time 
insisting that any attempts to overthrow the democratic regime will provoke "a 
severe US response" (Shutt 2001: 148). 
 In terms of citizenship, the linking of democracy to economic globalization 
has "contributed to the decline in quality as well is the significance of citizenship" 
(Demmers 2004: 12). As important decisions effecting the international 
community are continually made by secret elite councils, corporations, and the 
undemocratically elected leaders of the Bretton Woods institutions, locally elected 
officials have less say in national politics.  The options offered to the citizen are 
becoming far less meaningful, especially for the bottom 80% of the citizenry that 
appears to be losing out as a consequence of economic globalization (Demmers 
2004: 12). 
 This response of inability to actively participate in the political and 
economic decision-making process has led to increased voter apathy, as well as 
many voters feeling helpless and frustrated. In Mexico this happens especially 
among the indigenous populations, who feel they are not represented at all and 
often go even as far as boycotting elections, and launching mass demonstrations 
(Nash 2006). In many Latin American countries this exclusion has even lead to 
severe violence and social movements, including the Zapatista uprising in 1994 
(Shutt 2001; Mindiola 2006).      
 Perhaps most striking about the neoliberal theory, in the context of an 
ideology which promotes democracy, is that it is expansionist and it locks out 
alternatives to governance and democracy. In fact, the slogan for neoliberalism,  
first quoted by Margret Thatcher previous prime minister of Great Britain, is 
"There Is No Alternative" to globalized capitalism.  It has even been turned into a 
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popular acronym to describe neoliberalism TINA (Shah 2006: 1)  
 Despite a growing body of evidence on the negative social impacts of 
neoliberalism (see Korten 2001;Fisher and Ponniah 2003; MacEwan 1999; 
Woodin and Lucas 2004;Shutt 2001) it's proponents do not blame the structure of 
the free market system, but yet on the actual governing process itself (Demmers 
et.al 2004 ). The World Bank began to use the term good governance in order to 
draw attention away from the World Bank's failing Structural Adjustment 
Programs and to put the blame on the governing practices in those countries. 
(Datemmers et.al 2004) 
  
Good governance in the Era of Neoliberalism 
Although the term remains rather vague, good governance is defined as "the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of the country's economic 
and social resources for development."  Good governance is to be achieved 
through "enhanced accountability" within the public sector, transparency and 
"openness" in decision-making, the rule of law, more efficient public management, 
and "capacity building" to enable the initiation and implementation of market-
based economic reforms, an "essential element" for good governance (The World 
Bank 1992: 1 in Demmers 2004: 306). 
 Demmers et al. (2004) gives a very critical analysis of the term good 
governance, and asserts that "for each of the institutions and countries promoting 
good governance,  it's had clearly to do with the use of control, authority and 
power" ( Demmers 2004:7), as opposed to participation, transparency, and 
democracy.  He goes on to assert that the rhetorics of the World Bank began to 
change from an anti-communist to a pro-democratic stance in an attempt to further 
the economic interests of the Bretton Woods institutions and the United States in 
developing countries: 
"The discourse of good governance emerged at the time that the promotion of democratization had already 
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become an important element of the dominant international agenda for development.  The emphasis on 
democracy was triggered by the shift of US foreign policy in the 1980s as soon as the international 
communist threat faded, and the risk that the democratization of nonindustrialized countries would be at 
odds with American economic interests and convictions were strongly diminished, pro-democracy policies 
and participatory development replaced the anti-Communist and therefore frequently pro-authoritarianism 
policies of the US and Bretton Woods institutions ( 2004: 7)."  
 
Despite the Bretton Woods institutions' pro democratic,  good governance,  pro-
human rights and pro participation rhetorics however, the neoliberal institutions 
continue to have an underlying free-market agenda which measures success in 
terms of economic growth, and seems to ignore many of the social factors and 
negative consequences of their system. Their policies are not necessarily in the 
best interest of the common good, and thus their rhetorics  seem to be 
unsubstantiated (Demmers et al. 2004; Korten 2001).    
 Ironically, neoliberalism does provide a window for social movement and 
change, if only indirectly.  The World Bank's rhetoric provides these groups more 
protection against military oppression as several states in Latin America are 
becoming more image conscious due to increased dependence on attracting 
international capital to pay back their foreign aid debts (Collier, Collier 2005)   
 
CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
2.1 Location of field research 
San Cristobal de las Casas, in the state of Chiapas, was chosen as a base for 
fieldwork because it is the the most centrally located city with access to the 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities.  In San Cristóbal, there is access to various 
resources on my topic which were not readily available other places. It is the 
center for many anthropological libraries, the home of several academics who 
have done research on the Zapatistas, community theatres showing weekly 
documentaries on the Zapatistas, anthropological institutes, and most all of the 
NGO’s working with the Zapatistas have their main offices in San Cristobal.  In 
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addition, the Zapatista autonomous municipality of Oventic was only an hour and 
a half van ride from San Cristóbal. 
 
2.2 Methodological Choices 
When deciding on different methodology, a researcher can start by asking 
themselves "which data are most appropriate to the research problem"?  Is a 
researcher more interested in what people are feeling, thinking, or what they're 
doing?  (Silverman 2004: 61).  The topic of this paper centers around alternatives 
to liberal representative democracy, and considers the Zapatista government 
structure as a possible alternative. The primary aim in doing field research was to 
gather facts about the Zapatista 'way of doing'.  Information about what people are 
thinking or feeling is only considered if it in some way directly relates to or adds 
valuable insight into the research topic.  
 The primary data that was collected pertained to the Zapatista government.  
This included their electoral process, government tasks and responsibilities, term 
limits, government structure, role as social provisionary etc. The research was 
centered primarily around the Juntas of Good Government (JBG), which began in 
August 2003.   Since the JBG's are a relatively new government initiative, there is 
very little academic information available on them and their government practices.  
It was determined that interviews with the actual government officials themselves 
would to be the best method for gathering this data.   
While in the field, certain problems with access to the different regions of 
Zapatista control arose due to the danger of paramilitary violence in the region. 
This limited the scope of my research, and required the gathering of supplemental 
data through interviews with researchers that had substantial knowledge or had 
done extensive research on the Zapatista communities and government practices.   
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Interviews 
During the period of January 2006 to March 2006 I carried out 17 interviews in 
Mexico City and the state of Chiapas.  Interviews were primarily conducted with 
three different groups.  The first group was made up of members of the Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN) general command; the Juntas of Good 
Government in Oventic and De Garrucha (Chiapas, Mexico); and Zapatista 
citizens not affiliated with either the Zapatista military or civil government.  
 The second group was made up of members from local NGOs including 
Fray Bartolome de Las Casas Human Rights Center and CIEPAC-Center for 
Political and Economic investigations for Community Action. For reasons of 
safety and anonymity, the identity of the some NGOs, NGO officials, and all of 
Zapatista citizens is not revealed.  
The third group is composed of academics and authors with a relevant 
background in the topic of study. These include anthropologist, author, and 
professor emeritus, June Nash; journalist and magazine editor Juan Anzaldo 
Meneses- CE-ACATL, Senior Professor for Latin American Culture Studies- 
UNAM, Dr. Jose Moreno; and Professor in the department of Philology-UNAM,  
Dr.Carlos Lenkersdorf.  
 
Type of Interviews 
After deciding that it was primarily interviews, as opposed to other methods which 
would give me access to the information I needed, the next choice was then what 
type of interviews (e-mail, telephone, or face-to-face) and what structure they 
should take (standardized/unstandardized, structured or informal conversations). 
 I chose to conduct face-to-face interviews with Zapatista government 
officials, EZLN general command, and the Zapatista community members for 
several reasons.  Although the least expensive option, e-mail interviews would 
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have been infeasible because very few, if any, of the Zapatistas that I had planned 
on interviewing had access to e-mail. This also holds true for telephones, as the 
Zapatista communities communicated with CB radios and did not have access to 
telephones.  Besides the government centers, the Caracols, virtually none of the 
communities have neither electricity nor Internet access.  A more fundamental 
reason for choosing face-to-face interviews from methodological standpoint, was 
that there was the larger opportunity to ask follow-up questions and  expand on 
ideas. In face-to-face interviews, it is also easier to see whether an interviewee 
understands the questions (Johananessen et.al 2004). There's also something to do 
be said for personal chemistry and a face-to-face interview.  If a good rapport is 
built up during an interview there is the possibility of  getting more information 
than would be available over the phone or through e-mail, and the opportunity of 
scheduling follow-up interviews if need be (Johananessen et.al 2004). 
Interviews with academics and researchers were conducted face-to-face when 
possible, or by e-mail.   
 
Interview Structure 
 Methodological choices centered around fact gathering, as opposed to 
measuring what people were thinking, or what their opinions were on a certain 
topic. Positivism , which focuses on data that provides access to facts or beliefs out 
there in the world, seemed to be a plausible guideline for conducting research 
(Silverman 2004).One positivist approach is conducting standardized interviews 
(Silverman 2004: 89).  Positivists argue that standardized interviews can be more 
easily cross checked, and thus are a more reliable set of data (Silverman 2004).  
Although this may be, throughout my research it didn't always happen that I was 
after the same information from every informant, nor did I always need to cross 
check the information, so standardized interviews were not applicable.  Also, 
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standardized interviews, with questions asked in the same order, is quite a rigid 
approach.  Since I was after general facts about different groups, I opted for a 
method which would allow me more flexibility.  
 Interviews ended up being primarily semi-structured, i.e. open-ended 
questions with certain key themes.  These themes included: 1) the Zapatista way of 
doing, i.e. governing practices, communal living practices, education, health etc. 
2) the Zapatista worldview 3) the Zapatista movement These topics were chosen 
because I was most interested in seeing how the Zapatistas govern, what kind of 
procedures they had, and how similar or different it was to Western forms of 
organization. 
 
Observation   
In addition to interviews, I conducted two weeks observation in two Zapatista 
communities.  While in San Cristobal de las Casas I was able to get authorization 
from Fray Bartolome Center for human rights to enter into the Zapatista 
communities of Emiliano Zapata and Las Tacitas in order to conduct observations.  
 The reason to conduct observation was primarily to gain knowledge that 
was not possible to gather in another way. It was also a good way to distinguish 
between what people say versus how things really are. Observation can also be 
helpful when there are language barriers, ethical barriers, etc., and can be used as a 
supplemental method to find answers for research questions or see them from 
another view point. However I did not choose observation as my primary method, 
as it is normally very time consuming and resource draining, and could not 
provide the majority of the information that I was after (Johannessen et.al 2004).  
   
Written texts 
In terms of researching the Zapatista ‘way of doing’ text served primarily as 
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supplemental data to interviews and observation, not a source of analysis in itself. 
In other parts of the paper, text is used to present varying opinions and viewpoints 
on the subject matter discussed. 
 
Ethics: Covert Observation Versus Informed Consent  
When conducting research there are always certain ethical questions to consider.  
A fundamental one being the decision to conduct covert or overt research. Covert 
access means that research is being conducted without a subject' s knowledge. In 
contrary, overt access is based on informing subjects and getting their agreement  
(Silverman 2004).  All of the interviews conducted were performed with overt 
access.  In fact, in order to use any type of recording device in interviews with 
Zapatista citizens, authorization would have to be granted by the Junta of Good 
Government.  Any information obtained otherwise, was specifically not to be used 
in this project. In Oventic, I was able to get authorization to interview the general 
command of the EZLN, and the JBG themselves, as well as several others on two 
separate occasions.  While staying in the Zapatista communities however, it was 
impossible to get authorization from the JBG beforehand for each individual that I 
spoke with, therefore, interviews had to be presented as informal conversations 
and could not be recorded. Zapatista citizens were well aware that I needed 
authorization from the JBG to interview them, however they allowed the 
information obtained in these conversations to be used as long as their identities 
were concealed.   
 
2.2 Findings 
Currently, there are five regions of Zapatista control: Los Altos, Los Altamiranos, 
El Norte, La Selva Tteltal, and La Selva Tzotzil. Within these five regions, are 
political centers known as  "caracols" or seashells, which include Oventic, Roberto 
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Barrios, Morelia, La Realidad, de Garracha.  Each region is made up of four to six 
Zapatista Municipalities in Rebellion (MAREZ), and there are 30 municipalities in 
total (Cal y Mayor 2005: EZLN January 2006) .  In the Caracols, there is both a 
house for the civil government,"Casa  de la Junta de Buen  Gobierno" [House of 
the Good Government Junta], which houses the JBG and 1 or 2 delegates from 
each one of the  Autonomous Councils of that  region, and a house for the military, 
the EZLN general command and the 'Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous 
Committee' (CCRI) (obsv. Oventic, De Garracha 2006; Cal y Mayor 2005).  
 The functions of the  Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities are the 
provision of justice; community  health; education; housing;  land; work; food; 
commerce; transportation; information and culture; and local  movement. In 
addition they emphasize gender equality and try to encourage women to 
participate at all levels of civil government (EZLN January 2006; women's 
cooperative president 2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003)  
Table 1 
Zones of jurisdiction Number of MAREZ 
Altamirano  7 
Los Altos 7    
Norte   7 
Selva Tojolobal 4 
Selva Tseltal 4 
 Table 2 
Civil government Regional government Municipal government Community 
government 
description  junta of good 
government together 
with one or two 
delegates from the 
MAREZ 
autonomous councils 
together with an 
appointed body of 
officials engaged in 
different commissions 
of work 
community 
representatives 
total number 5 30 exact number unknown 
 
 
 Table 3 
Military EZLN CCRI 
Description Zapatista Army  civil appendage of the EZLN, 
designed as a checks and balance 
to monitor the EZLN 
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Government Structure  
There are three officially recognized levels of civil government within the 
MAREZ: 1.  Regional- the Junta of Good Government, usually 4-5 
representatives, 2.  Municipal- Autonomous Municipal Council,  each 
representative is chosen for one area of administration within the autonomous 
municipality, the number can vary 3.The community-representatives of the 
communities, numbers vary. See table 1 (JBG De Garrucha Feb. and Oventic 
March 2006).   
24 delegates are elected every three years by a grand assembly in each 
municipality.  Delegates can not be reelected, and there's a stipulation that 50% of 
the positions of the Junta must be allotted to women.  There are no special 
qualifications or requirements that one needs in order to be a member of the civil 
government.  The members learn everything from their predecessors.   
 The members of the Good Government Juntas change continually. 
“Rotations” last from eight to 15 days (according to the region), after which the 
junta is replaced. The reason for such a quick rotation is to allow for the work of 
the JBGs to be rotated among the members of all the autonomous councils of each 
region.  This is so that the task of governing is not exclusive to one group and 
learning is for the greatest number of people possible. This serves to reduce 
corruption and give all members of their society an opportunity to directly 
participate in local government (JBG Oventic March 2006; EZLN March 2006 
Subcommandante Marcos 2003) 
 Although there are three different tiers of civil government, the Zapatistas 
are a ‘nonhierarchical’ organization. This means that among  the three levels of the 
Zapatista civil government (community, municipal, JBG), no single body has 
executive power over the other, rather they complement each other.   
Since Zapatista government had spread from the community to the regional 
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level, the JBG was created in order to counteract an unbalanced development in 
the Autonomous  Municipalities  and the communities and to mediate conflicts 
which  might arise between Autonomous  Municipalities, and between 
Autonomous  Municipalities and government  municipalities. Their functions also 
include the protection of human rights; the monitoring and implementation of 
community projects and work; keeping law and order in Zapatista territory; 
conducting foreign policy with international civil society; and to cooperate with 
the CCRI of the EZLN to promote and  approve the participation  of Zapatista 
citizens in activities or events outside the rebel communities (JBG Oventic March 
2006; Salmonelli 2005).  In other words, the JBG only coordinates the MAREZ 
but does not replace their functions. They act as a mediary between communities, 
regions, the state, and international actors like NGOs, but the ultimate political 
power lies within the communities (Cal y Mayor 2005; JBG March 2006).  
 Within MAREZ, the communities name their authorities, local health 
promoters, community teachers, and elaborate their own laws based on social, 
political, economic, and gender equality among the inhabitants of diverse ethnic 
communities (EZLN Jan.2006; Flood 1999). The indigenous communities 
themselves decide, at an assembly of all their members, whether or not they will 
belong to the Zapatista autonomous municipality. It is the communities who elect 
their representatives for the Autonomous Municipal Council, and as mentioned 
above they may be removed if they do not fully comply with the communities' 
mandates (JBG March 2006; Flood 1999).  
 The civil government does not have the power to make such major 
decisions as going to war or signing a peace agreement without first consulting 
with the communities through a 'consulta', or 'consultation', directly translated.  A 
consulta the is roughly a referendum where intense discussions in each community 
is as central to the process as the vote itself. Sometimes consultas can take months, 
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and have been a "great source of annoyance to the Mexican government, which 
always wants an answer to its proposals on the spot or within days" (Flood 1999: 
1)  
The consultations take place in every community and ejido where there are 
Zapatistas.  Voting is direct, free, and democratic. After the voting, official reports 
of the results of the assemblies are prepared. These reports specify the date and 
place of the assembly, the number of people who attended (men, women and 
children older than 12 years old), opinions and principal points discussed, and the 
number of people who voted. It was such a consulta that decided that the 1994 
rising would happen, although it was decided a year before Marcos and the army 
command thought they were ready. Consultas have decided all major dealings 
between the EZLN (and now the JBG) and talks with the government.  The 
decision to accept the San Andres agreement and later to break off talks with the 
government were all determined by consultas (JBG March 2006; Flood 1999). 
Unlike the Mexican state government, which has a history of authoritarian 
rule, neglect, and oppression of the indigenous people, the Zapatistas seem to have 
provided a form of local democratic government that not only seems to be 
working very well,  it is actually the more democratic of the two governments 
(Nash 2006;JBG March 2006).  Their initiatives are not only inspiring, due to their 
carefully planned and implementation thus far, they seem to represent a realistic 
alternative to indigenous self government and a working social democracy within 
their zone of influence. 
 
Role as Social Provisionary 
Unlike the Mexican government, the Zapatista government responds to the basic 
needs of the people now in providing free health care, education, and livelihoods 
to all of their citizens (interviews, observation 2006).  This is a "contradiction to 
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neoliberal system the demands of which are that people must sacrifice such social 
services now in the name of greater prosperity in the future" ( MacEwan 1999:6).  
The Zapatistas respect and value human needs and community, and seem to define 
development by a broader set of goals than just material gain (Zapatista citizen E.  
J., EZLN March 2006).  
 Health is one of the Zapatista's largest priorities, and efforts are moving 
along progressively.  In 1995 they began to push for clinics in every municipality. 
Now there are several clinics in the municipalities, but Oventic is still the central 
clinic. Oventic gets all of the supplies and distributes them to the other clinics.  La 
Clinica Guadalupe has been around since 1992, and in 1994, the year of the 
rebellion most of their activities were based on prevention and education, about 
water, latrines, nutrition.  Now the clinic is quite impressive.  It  has specialized 
departments including a gynecological, an obstetrician and a dentistry department. 
It also has a laboratory, a two bed infirmary, a waiting room, and an emergency 
room.   They have a cooperation with EMTs in San Cristobal Tuxtla Guiterrez, 
and patients can go to these hospitals for serious problems that the clinic does not 
have the resources to handle ( Zapatista hospital coordinator January 2006).   
 The clinic uses a combination of both conventional and natural or folk 
medicine.  It is is open 24 hours every day and is open for  everyone, even non-
Zapatistas. It is free for Zapatistas but non-Zapatistas have to pay on a sliding 
scale ( Zapatista hospital coordinator January 2006). Many non-Zapatistas, go to 
the clinic because it is cheaper,on average 50% less than state hospitals or 
pharmacies, and some even say that it's better than the state run clinics (Zapatista 
citizen E. 2006; Zapatista hospital coordinator January 2006).  
 Zapatista clinics have the help and  direct participation of specialists, 
surgeons, dentists, doctors, and nurses from national and  international civil 
society,  as well as from students and assistants in medicine  and odontology  from 
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UNAM, from UAM and from other institutions of higher  education.  These 
doctors all work voluntarily, and they sometimes even pay out of their pockets. 
Unfortunately the clinic lacks personnel and materials. All of this is taking place 
under conditions of extreme poverty, and technical and information  limitations 
(Zapatista hospital coordinator January 2006). In addition, the Mexican 
government does everything  possible to block national and international NGOs 
that are trying to work with the Zapatistas in improving their situation (Salmonelli 
2005).  
 In terms of education, legacies left over from indigenismo can still be seen 
in Chiapas' school system. The government's plan isn't to empower the indigenous 
peoples.  The children don't learn to speak their native language in state schools. I 
spoke with an official for the Education Department for the state of Chiapas whose 
sole responsibilities are to improve the view that indigenous people have of 
themselves.  In other words he encourages teachers to promote cultural diversity.  
He says that most of the teachers in indigenous communities are either of Spanish 
descent or mestizo, and they convince students that to be indigenous is to be 
uncivilized.  To live traditionally is to live in a backward state.  This leads to 
students being very ashamed to be indigenous.  Thus they do not learn their own 
language well because they are embarrassed, but they do not necessarily learn 
Spanish well either (Chiapas Educational Department Official 2006) . 
 The Zapatista secondary education curriculum has six major subject areas: 
1.  Communication and languages, 2.  Mathematics, 3.  Social sciences, 4. Natural 
sciences 5. Humanities, and 6. Art, theater and music.  Depending on the ethnic 
makeup of the community and the availability of teachers, most courses are taught 
in both Spanish and the native language of the community.  For example, in the 
community of Oventic which is primarily Tzotzil speaking, subjects are taught 
both in Spanish and Tzotzil.  Apart from the six subjects, traditional customs and 
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traditional medicine is also taught, along with the Zapatista anti-capitalist 
philosophy and social movement (Zapatista school official 2006). Despite the very 
religious background of many indigenous groups, religion is not a part of the 
curriculum. Literacy and primary education are hardly widespread, but one region 
already has  an autonomous secondary  school which, recently graduated a new  
generation  made up of men and women. Education is free to all students 
(Zapatista school official 2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003) .  
 Even though the Zapatistas have worked with local education officials to 
design their curriculum to be the same as the state curriculum so that it would be 
recognized in the case that the San Andres Accords were implemented. However, 
because the accords were never implemented, the Mexican government does not 
recognize educations received from the autonomous schools.  This makes it very 
difficult for Zapatista students to go on to higher education at the state level.  This 
is disheartening for the school official that I spoke with at Oventic (Zapatista 
school official January 2006). 
 Neither the educational services nor health services take in all the zapatista 
communities, but the majority now have a  means of obtaining medicine, being 
treated for an illness and  having a  vehicle for taking them to the city in case of 
illness  or serious accident. Currently the Zapatistas are building a new hospital in 
the community are of Emiliano Zapata because the Caracol De Garrucha doesn't 
have the means to reach communities fast enough with their ambulances.   
 In addition to education and health, the Autonomous Councils  look at 
problems  with land, work and trade, where they are making  a little progress. 
They also look at the issues of housing, food, culture, and information. In culture, 
the  defense of  language and cultural traditions is being promoted above all. In  
information, news in local languages is being transmitted through  the various  
Zapatista radio stations. The radio stations even transmit  messages recommending  
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that men respect women , and  calling for women to organize  themselves and to 
demand respect for their rights  (EZLN January 2006; subcommandante Marcos 
2003).  This is due to the fact that the Zapatista government has made the 
promotion of gender equality a major priority.   Currently this is an area where 
they are experiencing the most difficulties, although they are making some 
progress. Women hold high ranks in the EZLN, and they hold ranks in all of the 
governing bodies.  Even though the majority of positions are still held by men, 
gender equality is much better now than it was before the Zapatista uprising and it 
is continuing to progress (Subcommandante Marcos 2003;Xulum Chon January 
2006). As an example, in 2004 there were only 4 women in the JBG in Oventic, 
and now there are 12 (JBG March 2006).  There are also a higher percentage of 
girls attending school now than there was before the Zapatista uprising (Eber 
2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003).  These accomplishments can be contrasted 
with the other non-Zapatista communities, where in many cases, women are 
treated as unequal (Nash 2006).   
 
Preventing Inequality 
In terms of preventing inequality, the Zapatistas have found ways even under 
extreme poverty and military oppression.   
As mentioned above, preventing those with disproportionate wealth from gaining 
undue influence over the political agenda is "the single most important area of 
reform needed to enhance the quality of democracy." Even though the Zapatistas 
function primarily on the barter system, they do acknowledge the dangers of this 
happening.  They realize that there can be instances of certain communities fairing 
better than others, due to available resources, soil richness, and human resources, 
which brings up questions of rising internal frictions. Thus, one of the Zapatistas 
major goals is to balance out the different communities and their growth by 
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building up self-sustaining economies, helping the communities to help 
themselves.  This is done with finances from commercialization through 
cooperatives, i.e. coffee, honey, clothing and textiles, art, and other Zapatista 
products.  Of course it should be pointed out that much of the money that they 
receive for their self-sustaining economy would not be possible without foreign 
markets for their coffee and international NGOs (Eber; EZLN January 2006) 
 They have several Zapatista stores in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, as well is 
cooperatives in the Caracols and many of their communities. 20% of the money 
earned from the profits from the cooperatives stays in the cooperatives to maintain 
them, while 80% of the profits go to the communities. The communities are free to 
do with the money whatever they wish to do with it (EZLN March 2006;Xulum 
Chon January 2006).  The workers in the cooperatives do not receive payment, 
though everything goes to the community, and they seem satisfied with that 
(Xulum Chon 2006; Zapatista citizen J., G., V. 2006). 
 For example, everyone gets a certain amount of corn, candles, beans, and 
other staple items as a ration every month.  Anything above and beyond that, 
people obtained by trading in either other goods or services. Everyone works 
together. According to seven interviews with Zapatista members, as well as 
several informal conversations the consensus is that, although the scope of 
services provided by the Zapatistas is "not enough" it's better than before the 
revolution, and it is much better than what the state provides them. Everyone has 
employment, and can choose their own livelihood, and receives all of the services 
(i.e. health, education).  Workers begin at the age of 15 to 18 depending on the 
type of work and if they want to work or not.  Once Zapatistas turn 18 , they are 
expected to take on a duty of their choice in order to contribute to the community 
(Zapatista citizen 1-7 2006; EZLN January 2006).  
 The collective community system, based on bartering can be a problem 
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when outsiders such as NGOs infiltrate the communities creating inequalities 
among its members, and inequalities between communities.  In other one of the 
"chief concerns" of the MAREZ is that NGOs and others use their contacts with 
communities to raise funds that don't get to the community in the end, in essence 
exploiting the rebels to run an organization and pay outsiders.  This is not an 
unfounded concern since at times "70 to 80% of international aid turns into salary, 
overhead, and benefits for those who generate it "(Salmonelli 2005: 165).  Same 
document  Thus, their concern over NGOs and what rights they have in the 
communities and monitoring every last detail of their doings is a driving force in 
their foreign-policy.  Their concern for not creating favoritism or divisionism 
within the communities in making sure that no community is neglected is how 
they direct domestic and fiscal policy (Salmonelli 2005).   
 Donations and help from national and international civil society  is not 
allowed to be earmarked to go to anyone in particular,  to a specific  community, 
or Autonomous Municipality. The Good  Government Junta decides,  after 
evaluating the circumstances  of the communities, where that help most  needs to 
be directed.  The Good Government Junta imposes a "brother tax,"which  is 10% 
of the total cost of a project, if a community, municipality or collective receives 
economic  support for a  project (Salmonelli 2005).  In addition, surpluses or 
bonuses from the marketing of products from zapatista  cooperatives  and societies 
are given to the JBG in order to help  those who cannot  market their products or 
who do not  receive any kind of aid (Salmonelli 2005).The objective is  to balance 
the economic  development of the communities in resistance (Subcommandante 
Marcos 2003;  EZLN March 2006).   
 
CHAPTER 3 MEXICAN HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE  
3.1 Mexican Political Culture 
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 Political culture can be defined as "a set of beliefs, values and attitudes, 
norms and practices in which the citizens relate to the state, to political institutions 
and government authorities" (Dominguez 2001: 96). In this context then, Mexican 
political culture would be described as paternalistic, authoritarian and based on the 
believe in the "omnipotence" of a presidential system that concentrates power and 
provide goods and privileges (Dominguez 2001: 96-97; Peeler 1998).  This 
authoritarian political culture encourages 'clientist' relations and passivity as well 
as a lack of information on citizens' rights, while neutralizing or punishing "critical 
attitudes or the search of alternatives." (Dominguez 2001: 96).  
 Through the Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI), politics in Mexico 
have been corporatist, where Mexico has licensed and regulated religious, social, 
economic and popular organizations in order to effectively co-opt their leadership 
and circumscribe their ability to challenge state authority by establishing the state 
is the source of their legitimacy (Østerud 1997). Unlike pluralism, in which many 
groups must compete for control of the state, in corporatism, certain unelected 
bodies take a critical role in the decision-making process. In Mexico, corporatism 
has gone hand-in-hand with clientism, which can be defined as " the exchange of 
political rights for social benefits" (Hagene 2003). It is often associated with 
patron-clientism, a system of cliques based on personal connections and 
charismatic leadership. Today's Mexican political culture has been primarily 
molded by the previous centuries of corporatism and clientism through political 
strongman or cuadillos.  
Caudillismo is a term which describes the cultural phenomenon that first 
appeared  during the early 19th century in revolutionary South  America,where 
charismatic and popular militia leaders or caudillos had enough influence to gain 
political control. Each leader had his supporters that he,  in return for their loyalty, 
granted favors to (Weldon 1997 ; Harvey 1998). As with most other Latin 
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American countries, Mexico had a string of caudillos whose "prolonged 
hegemonies were punctuated by periods of instability, internal conflict, and 
external intervention"(Peeler 1998: 113)   
Mexico' s caudillos have been typically concerned with their own power 
and success, and despite Mexico's revolutionary policy of no reelection, rarely 
retired; they held onto power until they were overthrown (Peeler 1998; Harvey 
1998). Caudillos usually designated their successors and remained in power 
behind the scenes.  This was the pattern for almost a 20 years of revolutionary 
struggles from 1910 to the 1930s (Peeler 1998).  
 Perhaps the most famous of the Mexican caudillos at the state level were 
Generale Antonio López Santa Anna, Porfirio Diaz, and General Plutarco Elias 
Calles (Peeler 1998).  Santa Anna was quite possibly the most powerful general in 
Mexico in the 1820s and the main "arbiter of power in politics in Mexico" until 
1855 (Peeler 1998: 114). "Santa Anna was above all concerned about his own 
power, and he neither limited corruption nor imposed order."(Peeler 1998: 114) 
The Santa Anna era was marked by struggles among elite factions who sought to 
"control the government for the material benefits they might derive"(Peeler 1998: 
114).  
 After Santa Anna was overthrown by liberal forces in 1855, Benito Juárez, 
a Zapotec Indian, educated lawyer and previous Governor of Oaxaca became 
president of Mexico three years later.  But a conservative revolt kept him out of 
Mexico until 1861. In 1867 Juárez was restored to power and remained president 
until his death in 1872.  Although Benito Juárez ruled in the time of Caudillismo, 
he is not usually regarded as a caudillo.  Unlike Santa, he "had a more substantial 
and largely positive legacy” and there was no particular evidence that he sought to 
enrich himself in office (Peeler 1998: 114-115).    
 Juárez imposed La Reforma (The Reform), which "established definitively 
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the legal equality of every citizen, an indispensable basis for liberal democracy." 
La Reforma was the first political project in Mexico to aspire to something like 
liberal democracy (Peeler 1998:115).  
Porfirio Diaz, an influential and powerful liberal general challenged Juárez 
for the presidency in 1867 and 1871. He was elected president in 1876 and left 
office in 1880.  However he returned in 1884 establishing a dictatorship that lasted 
until 1910, known as The Porfiriato.  The Porfiriato significantly transformed 
Mexico by promoting a heaven for foreign investors and those with capital, while 
exploiting the most vulnerable sections of society, namely the indigenous and the 
poor (Peeler 1998: 115; Nash 2006).  
 The Porfiriato era was plagued with fraudulent elections, rule through 
"puppets" and clients, political repression, intimidation, and "brute force" (Peeler 
1998: 115).  During a revolutionary period beginning with the overthrow of  Diaz 
in 1910, two regional caudillos, Emiliano Zapata in the Southwest and Pancho 
Villa in the north, raised basic demands of social justice such as agrarian reform.  
Urban and industrial workers demanded rights and benefits long denied by the 
Diaz regime and its business allies.  The call for an "authentic" popular democracy 
was widely expressed. Most of these demands were embodied in the 1917 
Constitution, though few were consistently implemented.  "The gap between 
rhetoric and reality in the Mexican Revolution has always been wide" (Peeler 
1998:116). 
 In 1920 civil war broke out again, the incumbent president Venustiano 
Carranza was assassinated and general Alvaro Obregon gained control and won 
the election.  Plutarco Elias Calles, Obregon's successor, made it possible for 
Obregon to be reelected in 1928 through a constitutional amendment which 
lengthened the presidential term to six years and permitted reelection.  Ironically 
Obregon was killed the day after his reelection (Peeler 1998).   
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 From 1928 to 1934, Calles succeeded in installing several puppet 
presidents. He practiced traditional caudillismo, but he had developed an 
innovative instrument for carrying it out: the official Revolutionary party (Peeler 
1998).  On an official level, The National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was 
"intended to draw together the diverse strands of the revolutionary family to 
defend the revolution against counter revolutionary forces"(Peeler 1998: 118) The 
real agenda however was to monopolize control of the government in order to 
guarantee that PNR candidates would continue to win elections (Peeler 199). 
 Calles and his cronies had become an "incestuous clique of millionaires 
enriched by graft and plunder".  The last of Calles's puppet presidents was Lazaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940), who ironically worked to remove Calles allies from 
positions of influence and then forced him into exile in 1936 (Peeler 1998: 118).   
In the beginning of his presidency, his actions went according to the "script of 
caudillismo," but Cárdenas differed from other bosses in that he sought to rebuild 
popular support for the party with a series of popular but "controversial" measures 
including social welfare and security programs benefiting the workers, and the 
most extensive agrarian reform since 1910 (Peeler 1998: 118).   
 Cárdenas's reforms were though to be the "high watermark of revolutionary 
change in Mexico."  He made sure that the party represented all major 
constituencies of the revolutionary coalition thus domesticated in them and 
assuring that they could be controlled by the top leadership (Peeler 1998: 118-
119).  What he did in retrospect was to de-personalize caudillosmo, and by doing 
so, removed the fundamental cause of instability in Mexican politics.  (Peeler 
1998:119).   
 Another fundamental change was that Cárdenas established the principle 
that presidents could serve for one six-year term without possibility for reelection. 
This made it very difficult for any single incumbent to take power in Mexico, as 
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did Diaz and Calles, although it did not prevent presidents from being "virtual 
dictator's" while in office, nor did it stifle their ability to designate their own 
successors (Peeler 1998:119; Gilbreth, Otero 2001: 8).  Cárdenas's restructuring 
and reforms led Mexico to be among the most stable regimes in modern history 
and, by the same token, among "the most resistant to change" (Peeler 1998:119).   
 After Cárdenas, the Mexican political system entered a prolonged era of 
political stability, but it was by no means democratic.  As recently as 2000, 
Mexico was described as a " semidemocratic political system (Semo1999 in 
Gilbreth and Otero 2001: 9)". Civil liberties were "usually" respected, and the 
media had broad, although not unlimited freedom, however there was political 
hegemony through the Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI).  The PRI 
"captured" virtually all elective offices (Peeler 1998:119). In addition the Mexican 
political system had failed to alternate power .  They did this by allowing each 
outgoing president to choose his successor allowing the PRI to monopolize the 
executive years, successfully making Mexico single party state for more than 70 
years (Gilbreth and Otero 2001).  
 Electoral fraud was institutionalized through the PRI, where presidential 
candidates were "handpicked"  by the incumbent president and "ensured victory 
by use of electoral fraud when necessary" (Gilbreth Otero 2001; Peeler 1998: 
119). The presidency dominated the judicial and legislative branches, while civil 
society was co-opted by mass organizations controlled by the state (Bartra and 
Otero 2005: 397; Callier and Quartello 2005:32-36).  
3.1 Representative Democracy in Mexico 
The Mexican government has been characterized as having an "exceptionally 
strong presidency." The Mexican president has more wide-ranging powers than 
any other country in Latin America.  The president directs a "highly centralized 
federal system" in which states and municipalities ultimately appear to be subject 
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to the rule from the center (Weldon 1997: 225).  The president initiates virtually 
all legislation, which is often passes swiftly through Congress.  The president also 
has the ability to reform the Constitution by proposing amendments, which are 
frequently excepted by Congress with  only "cosmetic changes." The president 
also has the power to veto legislation in its entirety or in part (Weldon 1997: 225).     
 The president designates his own successor to the presidency and also 
nominates most of the congressional candidates of his party.  He also often names 
the candidates of the official party for governor.  He can have governors, mayors, 
and members of the Congress removed from their post.  Cabinet members are also 
chosen by the president and can be fired at the president's" leisure"..  The federal 
judicial branch is filled with his own appointees, which leads to a "compliant 
judiciary" (Weldon 1997: 225) 
Some scholars (Weldon 1997; Carpizo 1978) believe that the 1970 Constitution 
created a highly presidential system  in order to create greater efficiency and 
stability in government.  The the 18th 57 Constitution supposedly granted "too 
much power to the Congress in relation to the president, which led to later 19th 
century presidents to resort to "unconstitutional methods to strengthen their hand."   
For this reason they granted the president "extraordinary" constitutional powers.  
The nature of the presidency in Mexico today is viewed as an "unintended 
consequence" (Weldon 1997:227) 
The PRI's main tool in assuring their political dominance, has been co-
optation and rewarding groups and individuals for being loyal to the party.  
Cooptation has several definitions, but this paper uses co-optation to refer to the 
tactic of neutralizing or winning over a minority by assimilating them into the 
established group or culture (McLean 1996)  
 The state has had a history of oppressing those who dissent, while 
rewarding those who are loyal to the state (Bartra and Otero2005). For peasant 
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farmers in Mexico,  the "tension between co-optation and rebellion has marked 
their history" (Bartra and Otero 2005: 388) In other words, when the state feared 
reprisals they awarded certain loyal groups and co-opted others through 
government organizations in order to keep divisions among the people, so they are 
fighting themselves and not the government (Zapatista  NGO official L. 
2006;Peeler 1998 )  
 The hegemonic party system, authoritarian and repressive, gave 
autonomous organizations "little margin for action" (Dominguez 2001: 97), while 
governmental organizations like the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), and 
the Instituto Nacional Indígena (INI) were set up to co-opt and stifle peasant 
organizing and uprising, although doing little to actually better the situation for 
indigenous Mexicans (Johnston 2000). These institutionalized agents of the 
Mexican were designed  as a substitute for autonomous peasant organizing. 
Repression, combined with the "privileged access" to state resources and the 
promise of land, allowed these groups to keep autonomous organizing at a 
minimum (Johnston 2000: 467).   
Besides the "anti-democratic nature of corporatist control," the material 
gains of the revolution simply never arrived in regions like Chiapas. Campesinos 
in this state experienced minimal land reform; small-scale agricultural self-
sufficiency was not created, and local power structures dominated by landowners 
and cattle ranchers remained intact (Johnston 2000: 467). By the 1970s, 
independent campesino organizers in Chiapas found that groups like the CNC  
world not only unable to help them, but they were "actively participating in their 
repression" (Johnston 2000: 467) 
 Co-optation through the PRI even included rewarding smaller leftist parties 
for participating in elections in order to enhance the legitimacy of the elections 
process.   Because most parties were co-opted, opposition parties were "rather 
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insignificant" until 1978, when there were only four legally recognized political 
parties. Of these four, two had considered the same presidential candidates as the 
PRI in various elections. These parties were seen as "minor appendages of the 
ruling party."  Only the National Action Party (PAN) represented a serious 
opposition, but was rarely victorious (Peeler 1998;Gilbreth and Otero 2001:8).   
3.2 The Mexican State and Indigenous people 
Through the different political eras in Mexico the indigenous population have 
been the most vulnerable and exploited sector of society.  Indigenous people in 
Mexico have been oppressed for over 500 years by Spanish colonials, and later 
Mestizo ranchers and plantation owners . They have been enslaved, suffered 
indentured servantry, and been on the recieving end of extreme racism  ( Fray 
Bartolome 2006; Collier and Quaratiello 2005).  Throughout the entire colonial 
period the Spanish government viewed Indians as subordinates whom were "less 
than fully adults" (Collier and Quaratiello 2005: 21).     
 In Chiapas, which didn't join Mexico until 1824, the patterns of 
enslavement and indentured servantry lasted even longer than in other regions. 
Indigenous people in Chiapas were an exploitable labor force for the timber and 
coffee industries, and were brought to "virtual servitude" because of debts to the 
company stores(Rus 2001;Collier and Quaratiello 2005: 25). 
 Although the Mexican Republic officially abolished indigenous peoples'  
"categorically inferior" status in the post-colonial period (beginning in 1821), their 
de facto subordination continues even today,  as indigenous people are still treated 
as second-class citizens by the Mexican government (Collier and Quaratiello 
2005: 23).  The traditional practices, worldviews, philosophies, and native 
languages of the Mexican indigenous people are judged to be inferior and 
backward in the eyes of dominant Mexican society (Collier and Quaratiello 
2005;Chiapas State Official: Education Dept.  2006). 
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Indigenismo   
 State policy in the 19th-century attempted to exterminate its indigenous 
people both statistically and physically, so as to construct for homogenously white 
nationstate (Bartra and Otero 2005: 392). The Mexican states pursue a policy of 
"integration" or the altogether abandonment of indigenous cultures in favor of 
adopting the dominant mestizo culture (Bartra and Otero 2005: 392). This process 
of acculturation became known as indigenism or indigenismo (Bartra and Otero 
2005: 393) 
 Although the political presence of indigenous peoples was "diluted" 
through Indigenismo,  indigenous people began to organize around their demands 
for autonomy, self-governance and democracy in the 20th century. Indigenous 
people demanded control over land and territory but wanted at the same time to 
remain an important and "dignified" part of the Mexican nation state.  The 20th 
century gave way to the promotion of cultural and educational activities to recover 
the indigenous languages and culture.  Land, liberty and dignity became integrated 
in a sort of indigenous socialism, a "Mayan utopia" (Bartra and Otero 2005: 392).   
 In the 1940s, efforts at providing  indigenous people  with a real sense of 
belonging and empowerment were co-opted by the state's National Indigenist 
Institute (INI) which sought to rescue indigenous culture as "folklore," 
overlooking the demand for identity and the rights that emanate from it (Bartra 
and Otero 2005: 393).   
 The 1970’s and 1980’s gave rise to a large indigenous movement in Mexico 
involving many groups including campesinos, women, mestizos, and the 
indigenous poor. These groups demanded equal rights and the end to government 
oppression. At least two decades of passive resistance led some groups within the 
movement to take up arms.  Several communities in central and western Mexico 
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rose up in defense of land, forests and water, and against caciques (political and 
economic strongmen) and municipal governments.  In the struggles the main issue 
centered around land and their demands for it (Bartra and Otero 2005). Indigenous 
people in Latin America view land and the control of its resources as one of the 
collective rights that guarantees the cultural and "social survival" of peoples 
(Mindiola 2006: 1) 1  
 
Transition to Indianism 
During the 1980s in the 1990s many independent regional organizations emerged 
throughout Mexico, leading to an massive meetings and encounters which built 
solidarity, strengthened identities, and developed leadership.  By the end of the 
1980s the "indigenous agenda" or Indianism had been clearly defined: the right to 
autonomy and self-determination, the right to land and natural resources, the right 
to "freely determine internal political condition of communities", in agreement 
with traditional forms of organization and "the prevalence of traditional customary 
rights (Bartra and Otero 2005: 397)   
 The decade of the 1990s was a period in which the cultural diversity and 
Indigenous peoples’ rights "became quite relevant in Mexico" (Moreno 2005: 7).   
In 1990, Articles 16 and 25 of the State Constitution were amended, recognizing 
the plural character of the state based on the presence of its Indigenous peoples 
and the need to respect the traditions and democratic practices of Indigenous 
communities.  In 1990 Mexico ratified the Convention 169 of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) on the rights of Indigenous peoples and two years later, 
1  This demand for land originates in colonial times when the system of encomiendas, land granted by the Spanish 
crown, (1523-1531) laid the basis for the exploitation of the indigenous population. Many indigenous people lost their 
permanent land-base, were forced to resettle to other locations, or were wiped out by European diseases (Stephen 
2002).  During La Reforma under Jaurez,  indigenous communal property was undermined once again, and the the 
groundwork was laid for a "massive concentration of land"(Peeler 1998:115). But this was minor compared to the 
Porfiriato period,  where foreign and national entrepreneurs were encouraged to take advantage of laws designed to free 
up land, labor, and natural resources (Collier and Quaratiello 2005).  Large commercial plantations took over lands 
from indigenous communities and small holders, creating a growing class of landless peasants (Peeler 1998:115).   
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Article 4 of the Federal Constitution was reformed to formally recognize the 
multiethnic character of the nation (Moreno Jaimes 2006).   With these 
constitutional and legal reforms, Oaxaca placed itself at the "vanguard of the 
recognition of indigenous rights" (Moreno Jaimes  2006: 7).  In Oaxaca the 1990s, 
there was  approval of different pieces of legislation in education, administration 
of justice, and the electoral code which formally recognized indigenous rights in 
the state (Moreno Jaimes 2006).   
 
San Andrés Accords 
On January 1996 San Cristobal de Las Casas, the First National Indigenous Forum 
was held and attended by 757 indigenous delegates, 403 journalists, 248 guests, 
and 568 observers. And in October of 1996 the first National Indigenous Congress 
(CNI) was constituted in Mexico City. In the same year,  the Indigenous Bill of 
Rights was drawn up. This compilation of laws and stipulations came to be known 
as the San Andrés Accords, and it was the culmination of nearly 2 years of work 
by activists, popular leaders, academics,  and indigenous people from all over 
Mexico (EZLN 2006).  
 The San Andrés Accords, drafted in part with the cooperation of the EZLN 
and the Peace and Conciliation Commission (COCOPA), called for (1) respect for 
the “diversity” of indigenous communities, (2) “greater participation” of these 
peoples in making decisions and spending public monies, and (3) “autonomy of 
indigenous communities and their right of free determination” within the law 
(Grayson 2001: 1). The accords also stipulated the adoption of the following 
principles: Pluralism, self-determination, sustainability, consultation and accord, 
strengthening of the federal system and democratic decentralization; as well is 
requesting various constitutional and legal reforms (San Andrés Accords 1996) 
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 The drafters of the Accords worked rigorously to come up with a broad-
based compilation of laws and stipulations which every major indigenous 
organization could agree upon, and with the broadest spectrum of representation. 
The labors of these dedicated people together with the series of negotiations 
between the Zapatistas and Mexican government led to the creation and signing by 
both parties of the accords in 1996 (EZLN 2006).     
 
3.3 Indigenous Exclusion in Politics 
Mexico is an integral part of Latin America,which is categorized as one of the 
most unequal regions in the world, which has translated into exclusion for the 
most vulnerable sectors of society, namely the indigenous people  (Nash 2001; 
Mindiola 2006; O'Dso that Mexico isonnell 1993 ).  Explanations for this 
imbalance are complex and varied from country to country, but among them,  the 
impact of economic adjustment policies (the World Bank), the weakness of state 
institutions, and the "interdependence between the manner in which the nation-
state formation process was carried out" have considerably restricted development 
capacities, and governability in Latin America (Mindiola 2006:2 ; O'Donnell 
1993).  
 The socioeconomic crisis facing Latin America is characterized by various 
phenomena, but two factors are fundamentally important: 1) the fragility of the 
state, and 2) the  inability of political systems to generate spaces for dialogue and 
negotiation among political stakeholders  (Mindiola 2006 ). Various states have 
difficulty in fulfilling their basic functions such as political stability, rule of law, 
and control of violence. States' are incapable of preventing corruption and 
"particularism" in the distribution of goods and services (Mindiola 2006:2 ). This 
pattern is especially apparent in Mexico, as has been described in section 3.1.  
 According to Mindiola, "[t]he combination of both phenomena has 
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prevented the achievements of the democratization process from moving beyond 
formal terrain, and resulted in scant improvement for the Indigenous population in 
real terms in the past 25 years" (Mindiola 2006:3).  
 Although many Latin American countries, including Mexico have ratified 
legal texts and constitutions which recognize indigenous rights (see San Andrés 
Accords, usos y costumbres),  this has "not necessarily translated into new 
equilibriums regarding these disparities or an expansion of citizenship to 
Indigenous populations"(Mindiola 2006:3 ).  One of the reasons for this is that  
political institutions have not managed to create adequate spheres of "real" 
participation where Indigenous groups might be effectively represented in the state 
as valid "interlocutors" ( Mindiola 2006:3).  
 The lack of representation of indigenous peoples in state politics has led 
these groups to be dissatisfied with the decision-making process (EZLN 2006; 
Mindiola 2006 ). This frustration of being left out of important decisions which 
profoundly effect their lives together with a loss of self-determination, and 
deteriorating quality of life as a consequence of economic globalization has led to 
an emergence of social movements in Mexico and throughout Latin America 
(Nash 2001; Mindiola 2006)   
 These popular movements started a process of "indigenous emergence", 
which has led to increasing visibility of Indigenous peoples as "social and political 
stakeholders, and demands for recognition of their distinct identities and their right 
to political participation"( Mindiola 2006:3).  Indigenous popular movements are 
becoming an important external pressure on state governments to democratize.  By  
engaging civil society indigenous peoples are changing the political culture in 
Latin America, and are presenting new alternatives to the current process of 
institution building (Eber 2006; Bartra Otero 2005).    
 Ironically , among the different types of people of the world, indigenous 
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people seem to be the best equipped for finding alternatives to the capitalist/ 
neoliberal ideology because they do not share in the notions of capitalist expansion 
and thus often retain unique worldviews (Nash 2001).   
Indigenous people can give pointers on how new democracies can more 
effectively reform states to accommodate plural identities ( Mindiola 2006). 
  The state reforms that indigenous movements envision imply a "significant 
deviation" from the traditional nation-state model and the notions of democracy 
and citizenship (Mindiola 2006:3). One of the key elements of indigenous 
governance is the self-determination of peoples, "of which the practical expression 
is autonomy (not separatism) based on a regulatory system that organizes the 
social life." (Mindiola  2006:1) 
 
3.4 Indigenous Autonomy  
In the 1960s 1970s, the term "independent" became the symbol of democratic 
position i.e. "independent peasant unions", "independent conferences" of 
indigenous organizations.  Although independent from the PRI, however, these 
organizations could still be, and often were, politically subordinate to an 
opposition organization like the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).  These 
organizations were still lacking " autonomy "(Bartra and Otero 2005: 390) 
 The last quarter of the century autonomy became the buzzword and the 
"rallying cry" among oppositional and popular democratic organizations. The 
concept of autonomy became more generalized around 1984 when about 50 rural 
organizations, who's members were primarily of indigenous origin, constituted 
themselves into the national Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant 
Organizations (Bartra and Otero 2005: 391).   
 Although the word independence and the term autonomy are virtually 
synonyms, rejecting political subservience, autonomy was more associated with 
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social and economic self-management of peasant and cooperative production.  
Thus "autonomous" peasants rejected the guardianship of the state and set out to" 
appropriate the productive process"(self-management ) while neighborhoods and 
communities organized around the self managing provision of basic services like 
schooling and security  (Bartra and Otero 2005: 391). 
  The idea for autonomy for indigenous peoples goes even more beyond 
organizational independence and economic self-management, it means free self-
determination; that is self-government at the community level, according to their 
own norms, practices and customs (usos y custumbres).  Indigenous peoples see 
demands for autonomy as an ancestral right that precedes the current national 
state. In a sense, this claim is external to the hegemonic social system which exists 
in Mexico today (Bartra and Otero 2005:391).  
 In the transition from political independence to social economic self-
management and into self-government, the underlying concept of autonomy 
sharpened its connotation of otherness, of an alternative, popular democratic and 
multicultural project.  Autonomy has become what Bartra and Otero call an "anti-
systematic practice" by which the oppressed resist by constructing alternative 
organizational orders (Bartra and Otero 2005:392).   
 Indigenous autonomy is a very slow process and progresses in many 
different stages. It is the process of "overcoming and conservation of stages" 
where each new stage contains and retains progress from previous stages.  In the 
case of Mexico, indigenous autonomy has moved from "unanimous and 
monolithic politics towards a form of depoliticized self-management and then 
towards the demand for multicultural world were all worlds fit" (Bartra and Otero 
2005:392)  
 So, we see that this  form of self-governance  is not an invention or 
contribution of the EZLN. It comes  from further  back in time. At the time of the 
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formation of the EZLN , the foundations for indigenous autonomy and self-
governance had already been in place. Indigenous autonomous projects had 
already been operating for a while, although only at the community level, through 
building  clinics and  pharmacies (with the help of civil society) and training 
health workers (Subcommondante Marcos 2004). 
 The existence and permanence of the de facto autonomies in Chiapas have 
been directly associated with the history of the region and especially the history of 
the absence and inefficiency of the Mexican state (Cal y Mayor 2005; Van Der 
Haar 2005).  This is especially in terms of agrarian reform following the 1917 
constitution after the time for the revolution.  Campesinos confiscated lands in 
order to oblige the government to give them titles.  Lack of institutions which 
granted them land led to de facto autonomy at the cost of many dead and many 
arrested.  The state was militarily oppressive (Cal y Mayor 2005)  On the other 
hand the lack of the state to oversee the development of de facto autonomy's 
allowed them to live clandestinely in the 1970s and 1980s.  Numerous NGOs 
helped with providing education and health services to the most impoverished 
areas where the state was both absent and inefficient. Most of them were financed 
through the Catholic Church.  In the jungle and highlands areas and in the north 
they implemented projects of health, education production and commercialization 
through "promoteres" or promoters, local indigenous people which were trained 
for various specializations such as education and medicine, an order to assist their 
community members The weakness of the state in this area also made it possible 
for social mobilization(Cal y Mayor 2005: 243; EZLN 2006).   
 The 1990s saw an era of self-government through ejid's which was allowed 
by the corporate relations of the state with rural society, in or to secure political 
stability for the PRI in the area.  This allowed indigenous communities to live with 
their own authorities, mediates with their own mechanisms. There are various 
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autonomous projects, de facto, in Chiapas that are different in their extension and 
their functions and they don't always coincide with each other, quite the contrary 
sometimes they compete (Cal y Mayor 2005; Van Der Haar 2005).  
 
3.5 Neoliberalism in Mexico  
In the words of  EZLN spokesperson Subcomandante Marcos, Mexican social 
policy   
"The national economy ceased being one some  time ago [...] business is monopolized by large  
transnational  companies, the banks are saturated with foreign capital and the  ups and downs of financial 
speculation are driven by global, not  national,  variables" (Subcomandante Marcos August 2004).  
 
Neoliberalism has ultimately converted Mexico into what Joseph Nef calls a 
“receiver state,” or a state "whose power is reduced primarily in the areas of social 
provision and the social regulation of capital "(Vadi 2001: 129). Receivers states 
align themselves "forcefully" with foreign capital and with domestic interests that 
have liquid assets (Vadi 2001: 129).  Mexico's role as a receiver state has been 
further deepened by the accumulation of foreign debt from neoliberal institutions 
during the 1982 debt crisis, which has in turn increased Mexico's dependency on 
foreign markets and economic globalization (Collier, Collier 2005). On a material 
level, this has contributed to the lowering of living standards as well as lack of 
social provision. Politically, it has paved the pathway in which Mexico will follow 
in the decades to come.   
 Mexico's dependency on international financial institutions  has forced its 
compliance with the ideals set by the Bretton Woods institutions, which do not 
seem to value political, social and human rights beyond " their instrumental role" 
in economic and socioeconomic development, which is expected to be furthered 
by open markets and a "subsidiary state" (Demmers 2004: 8 ).  This can be 
confirmed  in the fact that, despite the growing international and national 
inequalities brought on by the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, they still 
pursue policies that hurt the most vulnerable sectors of society. The World Bank 
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for example has chosen a policy of taxation which, instead of requiring 
governments to collect "easily collected taxes, " or taxes on international trade and 
taxes on large firms, the World Bank proposes adding taxes on consumption and 
public services, "something which largely comes at a cost to citizens "(Demmers 
2004:10).  
 Another example is the fact that, it in order to make economies attractive 
for foreign investors, the Bretton Woods institutions oppose the standard 
minimum wage and labor unions. But, perhaps most importantly, these institutions 
continue to promote their agenda for "global free markets" in international politics 
despite mounting evidence showing  the increasing inequalities and negative social 
implications of the global free market (Demmers 2004:10)  
 Perhaps the greatest example for Mexico's subservience to the Bretton 
Woods institutions  is the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994. By disbanding credits and infrastructural supports for 
campesino agriculture, and by phasing out price supports under the terms of 
NAFTA the government appeared willing to sacrifice rural producers to unfair 
competition from imported and subsidized crops from the United States and 
Canada (Collier, Collier 2005; Stephen 2002) .  
NAFTA has drastically reduced (and will soon eliminate) most tariffs on 
agricultural goods traded among Mexico, Canada, and the United States. As a 
result, Mexico has been flooded by U.S. products (such as corn and pork) that cost 
one-fifth as much to produce (Rafael Tamayo-Flores 2001; Stephen 2002). This 
has created a major crisis for millions of Mexican farmers (Rafael Tamayo-Flores 
2001; Collier, Collier 2005; O'Malley et.al 1998 ).  
 Political involvement and social movements have increased in the past 
decade in response to the neoliberal development model. Among these social 
movements the indigenous people, of whom the majority are rural subsistence 
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farmers, are becoming some of the most vocal, as they are the ones to bare the 
worst brunt of neoliberal policies like NAFTA (Nash 2006 ).   
 
CHAPTER 4 THE ZAPATISTA UPRISING 
In the early hours of the new year, the general command of Zapatista Liberation 
Army (EZLN) issued the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle and over 4000 
indigenous people, many armed with nothing but pitchforks and sticks, and 
wearing black ski masks and bandannas on their faces, stormed the municipalities 
of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano, Chanal, 
Oxchuc, and Huixtan, Chiapas demanding "democracy, liberty, and justice for all 
Mexicans"(EZLN 1994).  
 According to Collier NAFTA was not the cause of the Zapatista uprising, 
but" the rebellion's timing and course reflect global processes"(Collier, Collier 
2005: 451).  2 Its principal causes of the rebellion lie in the 1980s when the world's 
financial planners mandated austerity (reduction in national government spending 
to pay back creditors). The reduction in social services required by the World 
Bank's Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) stimulated political opposition which 
the Mexican government met by increasing militarization (CONAPAZ 1997; 
Collier, Collier 2005). 
 The tensions were heightened in 1992 when President Salinas de Gortari 
put an end to the 27th Amendment of the Mexican Constitution, which in effect 
dissolved all previous land claims that had not yet been resolved, and prevented 
any new claims on land (Collier & Quaratiello 2005) The decision to end the 
agrarian reform and to allow privatization of agrarian resources that previously 
had been treated as 'social property' not only angered campesino groups with 
2   See June Nash (2001) who asserts that electronic communication and media can provide a global arena for protests that might never have been broadcast a few 
decades ago (2001: 20)  
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unresolved land claims but "threatened to open the countryside to exploitation by 
transnational agribusiness" (Collier, Collier 2005: 452).  
 Another factor causing public dissent was the lack of state social provision. 
Many state programs for education and housing, health and development  never 
really reached Chiapas. These marginalized people however had been promised 
that such distributed services would reach them "someday".  Their hopes were 
crushed with economic restructuring.  Even as declining real incomes plunged 
nearly 50% of the Mexican population below the poverty line, austerity dismantled 
or guided many public services (Collier, Collier 2005:452).  Those few resources 
that did reach Chiapas were often distributed in "partisan fashion to reward 
government supporters and punish opponents", further exasperating the gap 
between rich and poor campesinos that had been increasing due to unequal 
opportunities for supplementing campesino production with off farm income 
(Collier, Collier 2005: 453).  
 It is no accident that the Zapatistas chose January 1, 1994 as the date that 
they would rise up.  They were fully aware that the signing of NAFTA would be a 
major media event drawing the audience of millions of people from around the 
world. The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) entered the international 
scene as a way of stating the presence of indigenous peoples in the middle of a 
globalized world ( Nash 2001).  They declared war on the Mexican government, 
and denounced the new neoliberal policies that were to take effect that very day 
(EZLN 1994).  There were armed clashes in Chiapas between the Mexican army 
and the EZLN, which ended with a cease-fire two weeks after the uprising. The 
Mexican government has not launched a full-scale confrontation since. Instead, the 
Mexican government pursues a policy of “low-intensity warfare” using military 
intimidation and violent acts by para-military groups in an attempt to control the 
rebellion(Holloway and Paleaz 1998).   
 60
 
The Zapatista Movement Today 
Currently there is a military stalemate the Mexican government Zapatistas because 
neither side can afford to attack.  Zapatista principles  do not allow them to 
surrender and lay down their weapons (see discussion in next section), but they are 
outnumbered by the government troops.  Mexico's pressure to abide by the 
international conventions on human rights, however, constrain their ability to use 
covert military violence.   The Zapatistas have been able to mobilize international 
sympathy, and the government fears that having to fight a "genocidal war insures 
that any attack could turn into a public-relations nightmare"(Collier, Collier 2005: 
456) 
 There is also a political stalemate, where the government has declared the 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities illegal, and the Zapatistas refuse to return to 
negotiations.  Interestingly, the Mexican state is "counterattacking" them by 
establishing new municipalities that of their own design.  The government refused 
to ratify the San Andreas accords, however president Zedillo urged Chiapas's 
governors to write their own legislator and laws on indigenous rights and culture 
despite "vocal opposition from minority parties" Whereas the San Andreas accords 
called for the government to recognize the rights of indigenous 'peoples' the 
governor's laws "granted" rights to indigenous communities(Collier, Collier 2005: 
457)  
 The military and political stalemate in Chiapas has rendered at least half of 
the state ungovernable and therefore unwelcome to transnational capital.  The state 
is ungovernable because of internal frictions and paramilitary violence. This began 
with PRI support of paramilitary groups groups to harass Zapatista support base 
communities.  Most of these communities have been divided into opposing 
factions by economic processes in the 1980s, where wealth was "dependent on 
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cultivating PRI officials rather than on wooing local followers".  As a result  the 
government found allies, many of whom were already acquiring arms on their 
own, ready to participate in a low intensity war to break down the Zapatista 
rebellion and their support bases (observation 2006; EZLN 2006; Collier, Collier 
2005: 457) 
 Social provision of the government also continues to be low, and 
nonexistent in many areas of Chiapas, especially in the poorest regions where 
Zapatista support is the strongest (observation 2006; Collier, Collier 2005).  The 
Zapatistas have prohibited their supporters from accepting government money 
(EZLN 2006).  And although Zapatistas welcome help from NGOs, the PRI 
government had mounted an anti-foreigner campaign that made it very difficult, if 
not impossible for foreigners and any sympathetic Mexicans to help build schools 
and hospitals that the Zapatista communities need.  Luckily this anti-foreigner 
campaign has subsided a bit since the late 1990s when it was launched, and when I 
was there in 2006, I saw little evidence of international NGOs being prohibited 
from helping the Zapatistas. Some local NGOs do however, fear paramilitary 
reprisal for helping the Zapatistas (observation 2006, Chiapas NGO official1 and 2 
2006).  According to many, the Zapatistas have also contributed to, rather than 
restrained, the militarization in the region (Collier, Collier 2005; Chiapas NGO 
official1 2006).   
 
CHAPTER 5 THE NEW ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT  
Armed with Weapons and Words 
The Zapatistas are often portrayed as a social movement, distinct from a truly 
revolutionary guerilla struggle. Like other popular armed movements in Latin 
America (i.e.EPR), the Zapatista movement began with a goal of the dissolution or 
restructuring of the existing government institutions, but the Zapatista way of 
 62
doing things is fundamentally different than other Latin American armed 
movements in many ways. The most obvious being that the Zapatistas did not aim 
to overthrow the government (Johnston 2001; Bruhn 1999). although the 
movement initially called for the dissolution of the federal government and/or 
restructuring of its oppressive institutions, the Zapatistas did not vie to take power.  
On the contrary, the Zapatista movement acknowledges the importance of state 
government,  and do not wish to weaken state sovereignty by breaking apart from 
the state (interview 2006 Oventic)  
 Although the Zapatistas  are indeed armed and have no intention of laying 
down their weapons, the EZLN has engaged in a war of “ideas not bullets.” 
In this war, the EZLN used words as weapons to prevent its own military 
destruction, to attract resources, and to build a broad coalition of mostly non-state 
allies to pressure the Mexican government for resolution of its demands-primarily 
the implementation of the San Andrés accords.   
 Though the EZLN’s has the capability to use continued violence through 
terrorism and bombs, which would cause fairly serious problems because Chiapas 
generates about half the nation's electricity supply, it has chosen to use non-violent 
tactics such as peace marches and dialogue with national and international media 
to further its cause (Bruhn 1999). 
  Just 12 days after declaring war, the EZLN excepted a ceasefire to which it 
adhered for four years; although the EZLN believed armed uprising was 
necessary, they used violence cautiously in the initial miltary attacks, and since the 
cease-fire, have vigorously supported non-violent, educational tools of struggle to 
achieve their objectives without bloodshed, and had even deliberately refused to 
respond violently when provoked by the Mexican military and paramilitary 
groups.  (Johnston 2001; Bruhn 1999). 
 The EZLN uses most of their time and effort on  building solidarity, not 
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only among local indigenous communities and Mexican civil society, but also 
internationally. They do this primarily through international and local media 
campaigns, mostly by way of communiqués, interviews, and other media events 
such as the peace marches mentioned above. They also use the Internet quite 
extensively. 
 Their campaigns have a high success rate because they address groups in a 
discourse that most people can relate to. Their communiqués tend to focus  on 
satire and humor, and mainstream themes and symbols that are easily embraced by 
civil society and the international community (Bruhn 1999). The EZLN stresses 
concepts like peace, justice, and democracy while steering away from leftist 
ideologies like Marxism and Leninism used by other traditional guerrilla groups 
like the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). They try to promote solidarity in the 
media by addressing their audiences in terms of identity-i.e. ethnicity, gender-as 
opposed to class struggle. ( Bruhn 1999). Perhaps the most appealing to their 
audiences is the fact that the EZLN's admits that it does not have "the" only 
answer, and only calls for a broad "solidarity with all those who, in general, are 
against the penetration of neoliberal capitalism in the lives of all people; or in 
other words, support for uniqueness in a global economy” (Bruhn 1999: 27).  
 The new Zapatista movement also has a link between the unique and often 
hard to understand indigenous worldview and the Western worldview: 
Subcommandante Marcos.  Marcos, a nonindigenous Mexican whose identity is 
disguised behind a ski mask, serves as a important link between indigenous 
society and  the Mexican civil society at large. Marcos’ charisma and 
intellectuality makes him appealing as a media figure. However his humbleness, 
adaptability and open-mindedness allows him to bridge the gap between the 
indigenous and western world views (Bruhn 1999; Gilbreth and Otero 2001).  
 The evidence does suggest that  words are indeed the Zapatistas most 
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important weapon. Johnston however rejects the assertion that the Zapatistas are 
"merely a social movement, not to be confused with a 'real' guerrilla army." He 
asserts that those who participated in the 1994 uprising  made international 
headlines "only because they chose guns over unarmed protest"  (Johnston 
2000:46) Even so, the Zapatistas' armed struggle was fought on the level of a 
Gramscian "war of position."3   The rebels did not aim to take over the centers 
of government, but instead sought to capture the "hearts and minds" of Mexican 
civil society in order to rearrange power relations at a more profound level. The 
Zapatistas hoped to use military means to "catalyze" the formation of a new 
historic bloc, comprising new democratic ideas, institutions, and "equitable 
material strategies" (Johnston 2000:465) 
The Zapatistas are trying to change the way both local and national 
government is run without toppling the existing regime and taking power. They  
are working with civil society, organizing at the grassroots level, and a working on 
making structural changes from the bottom to the top.    
The Zapatistas believe that a real revolution could not occur through a 
change in the reigns of power, but must involve long-term change at the level of 
individual consciousness, state institutions, material structures, and civil society 
(Bruhn 1999; Holloway 2002; EZLN 2006).  
 The Zapatista movement embodies what MacEwan calls a non-reformist-
reform or revolutionary reforms which "advance toward a radical transformation 
of society [... and] bases the possibility of attaining its objective on the 
3  Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci contemplated the nature of revolutionary change, and saw a historical shift in 
strategy occurring from the 'war of movement' to the 'war of position'. In a war of movement, a ruling group seizes 
control of the state, as in the Cuban Revolution. Gramsci believed that a war of movement was less feasible in the 
democracies of Western Europe, and saw possibilities opening up through a war of position that targets ideas, attitudes, 
the state, and civil society. In a war of position, counter-hegemonic organizations merge together to form a new historic 
bloc and build up the social foundations of a new state. The goal is to build a broad counter-hegemony, while resisting 
co-optation by more powerful hegemonic forces. This is an admittedly slow and onerous task, requiring effective 
political organization capable of organizing new groups of working classes, and building bridges between peasants and 
urban marginals 
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implementation of fundamental political and economic changes" (MacEwan 1999: 
15).   In other words they assume structural reforms.  In the case in Mexico, 
political and economic reforms have been limited to reformism, which "rejects 
those objectives and demands-however deep the need for them-which are 
incompatible with the preservation of the system" (McEwan 1999:18).  According 
to MacEwan participation is key to having lasting revolutionary changes.  He 
asserts that, 
"even where significant political democracy exists, and certainly where it does not, maintenance of the 
status quo depends upon people being excluded from involvement in the [political and] economic decisions 
that affect their lives and in the formulation and implementation of economic policy.  Regardless of the 
content of reforms, if the method of reform does not challenge the alienation of most people from control 
over their [political and] economic lives, it's positive democratic implications will be limited" (McEwan 
1999:18).  
 The Zapatista movement challenges the status quo by striving to include 
virtually everyone in the political decision-making process in order to guarantee 
for the greatest possible participation.  
 Johnston argues that the Zapatista movement  demonstrates how the lines 
between democracy and violence are blurred in the context of globalization, and 
the related phenomenon of low-intensity warfare and low intensity democracy. 
Johnston states that "clearly the Zapatistas should be differentiated from those 
using more violent methods of guerilla warfare," but suggests because they are 
armed "the Zapatistas cannot serve as exemplars for peaceful protest" (Johnston 
2000:465),  The Zapatistas themselves are well aware of the contradiction between 
an armed movement, peace and democratic reforms.  This contradiction was a 
major reason why Zapatistas departed from the armed EZLN to an unarmed 
governing body; the Junta of Good Government, which is where the focus will 
now turn (Johnston 2000; EZLN 2006). 
 
The Birth of The Junta of Good Government 
The areas of Zapatistas control are largely made up of extremely poor rural 
indigenous communities, of which communities of a dozen to over 100 families 
 66
are typical. They live off the land without the benefit of modern agricultural 
machinery, and some of the men have to work outside the village in local towns or 
even as far as the USA to send back remittances to their families (Zapatista citizen 
E February 2006).  Of course, isolated from the rest of Chiapas, a good number of 
indigenous communities have been living in de facto autonomy according to their 
own customs long before the Zapatistas demanded the Mexican government to 
allow them autonomy under the law (Collier 2005;.Van Der Haar 2005) .  
However in many villages, the only political presence tended to come from the 
Catholic church's "liberation theology" and the EZLN itself (Flood 1999:1). Prior 
to the rebellion many communities did not have sufficient fertile land and 
community members had to work, often under horrible conditions, for local 
landowners. The rebellion caused many landowners to flee in fear, and in many 
cases their abandoned land was taken over and used to establish new communities 
(Zapatista citizen G, E., J. Feb. 2006).  
 In 1998 the Zapatista support bases decided to construct Zapatista 
Autonomous Rebel Municipalities (MAREZ) in order to put into effect the de 
facto autonomy of the San Andrés Accords that the federal government refused to 
implement.  All of the MAREZ are unique in that some of them have only one 
ethnic identity and others have pleural ethnic identities including the different 
groups who speak a different Mayan languages (Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Tojolobal, and 
Choles), but some municipalities are made up of both indigenous and mestizos 
(observation las Tacitas 2006; Cal y Mayor 2005).  They don't have one single 
constitution, besides the San Andrés Accords, for "general political principles 
which orientate the practical politics of the members [my translation]." The 
municipalities are dynamic and constantly changing, which means that the 
Zapatistas have to constantly be adapting their rhetoric and their policies to 
include even greater numbers and to satisfy their members.  One principle that 
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they do have in common however in Zapatista lands is the principle of ‘governing 
by obeying’. Governing by obeying, which pre-dates the Zapatista presence in 
Chiapas, is one by which authorities are monitored carefully by the community 
and recalled and replaced when necessary (EZLN January 2006). This philosophy 
is used in addition to their traditional form of direct democracy which had been 
used at the community level since ancient times (JBG March 2006). 
 There was an enormous growth of the EZLN in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
which led the practice of governing by obeying to move from the local to the 
regional level. Functioning with local ‘responsables’ (that is, those in charge of the 
organization in each community), regional ones (a group of communities) and area 
ones (a group of regions), the EZLN saw that in this traditional philosophy of 
governing by obeying, those who did not discharge their duties were, "in a natural 
fashion, replaced by another." The EZLN copied this model but, given that they 
area political-military organization, the general command made the final decision 
on removal of authorities and such (JBG Jan. 2006; Subcommandante Marcos 
2003:1).  
 Up until 2003 the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee, (CCRI) had 
jurisdiction over the communities.  Regionally it was capable of making decisions 
that affected individual communities. For instance when one community in the 
region of Morelia wanted to occupy land shortly after the rebellion the local CCRI 
ordered locals to wait, expecting a region-wide land settlement after the 1994 
dialogues between the EZLN in the state government (McCaughan 1996). The 
CCRI is composed of delegates from the communities, but is in itself not a 
military structure. However they had jurisdiction over the different MAREZ, 
which often resulted in military members being a part of the associations and 
decisions of the local civil governments in the communities. In the EZLN's own 
words, their military "contaminated" a tradition of democracy and self-
 68
governance. The EZLN was one of the "undemocratic" elements in a relationship 
of direct community democracy which had been operating a "good while" before 
the EZLN was born (Subcommandante Marcos 2003:1).  In order to fix this 
problem of military contamination in civil government they created a new 
organization, with civil structures and political military structures separated (Cal y 
Mayor 2005: 251).   
 The "death" of the four Aguascalientes the EZLN had built, and  the "birth" 
of Caracoles in Rebellion and the new civil government, the Junta of Good 
Government, commenced on August 8 2003 to commemorate the first 
Aguascalientes built on August 8, 1994 for the first national Democratic 
convention.  This transition directed all domestic and foreign policies through the 
JBG not the command of the EZLN. They also made it so that the EZLN does not 
intervene at all in the designation or removal of autonomous authorities, and it has 
"limited itself to only pointing out that, given that the EZLN, by principle, is not 
fighting for the taking of power", none of the military command or members of the 
Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee are allowed to occupy a 
position of authority in the community or in the Autonomous Municipalities. 
Those who decide to participate in the autonomous governments must 
"definitively resign" from their position within the EZLN(Subcommandante 
Marcos 2003:1).  Now the CCRI's main function is to command the EZLN in each 
region and serve as a type of checks and balances by monitoring the operations of 
the Good Government  Juntas in order to prevent acts of  corruption, intolerance, 
injustice  and deviation from the zapatista principle of  governing by obeying 
(Subcommandante Marcos 2003; Cal y Mayor 2005).  
  
CHAPTER 6 THE FAILURES OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 
Peeler (1998: 189) asserts that "liberal democracy is the best system yet invented 
for protecting people from abuse by the government."  No other system does it 
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better over a sustained period, and it provides mechanisms for pursuit of the 
common good (Peeler 1998).  
In theory, the doctrines of liberal democracy promote freedom and are 
against the concentration of power in just a few hands, whether those hands are 
economical (monopolies) or political (strong states).  However, Mexico's liberal 
democracy has not been successful at limiting the concentration of corporate 
power (Demmers et al. 2004). In fact, quite the opposite is true, it has fostered the 
concentration of power. Policies for open markets have allowed market players to 
gain "freedom at the cost of citizens' political influence" (Demmers et al. 2004: 
11).  
  Peeler does acknowledge that Mexico has not met the criteria of a liberal 
democracy. And it seems highly unlikely that Mexico will ever reach the criteria 
(Hogenboom 2004).   Though changing focus in 2000, Mexico's authoritarian 
political culture based on clientism and corporatism and corrupt politicians that are 
primarily concerned with enriching themselves and their corporate interest seems 
to be a lasting legacy (Hogenboom 2004).  Mexico's dependence on the Bretton 
Woods institutions has led to austerity, which has contributed to the overall 
impoverishment of Mexican citizens. However, even if Mexico did live up to the 
standards of other liberal democracies in Latin America, they could possibly 
establish a stable regime (Peeler 1998), but this does not necessarily mean that it 
will be a social democracy.   
When one looks at liberal democracy in terms of promoting social 
democracy, there is evidence of flaws which go deeper than merely bad governing 
practices (Demmers et.al 2004).  Of course the underlying economic global system 
is at fault for much of this, but the representative aspect of liberal democracy, of 
which is presidentialism in the majority of Latin American countries, provides an 
easy vehicle for implementing the global economic agenda.  The the lack of 
mechanisms (combined with the inability or unwillingness of representatives) to 
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include the general electorate in decisions concerning their socioeconomic and 
political lives has led to marginalization, frustration, and ultimately violence and 
social unrest (Mindiola 2006; Shutt 2001).  It is logical to assume then, that if 
representative democracy's goal was to mitigate these problems (which seems the 
purpose of democracy), it should include mechanisms which foster inclusion in 
this area.  The next section will discuss in detail the flaws which make 
representative democracy incapable of this task. 
 
Failures of Presidential Democracy  
Many scholars have argued that the presidential form of government has been a 
major contributor to the "travails of democracy in Latin America in recent years."  
This argument has been widely accepted and there are few published counter 
arguments (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 12). The failure of presidential 
democracies in Latin America has led many scholars to assert that perhaps 
parliamentary regimes would fare better (Linz and Valenzuela 1994).  Although 
this is a very important point, it is not within the scope of this paper to give a 
detailed analysis of why a parliamentarian government will not fare any better in 
Mexico than a presidential system.  For a detailed account and critique of this see 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Linz and Valenzuela (1994).  It can be 
conferred with a review of neoliberalism and liberal democracy, that neither 
system fosters inclusion and participation in decision-making processes.  
However, since Mexico is a presidential democracy as is the majority of Latin 
American countries,  this paper has chosen to focus more on the presidential 
aspect of representative democracy. So when the terms 'representatives' and 
'representative’  is used, it is referring to presidentialism.  
 Mainwaring and Shugart  (1997) acknowledge that presidentialism has a 
generally poor record of sustaining continuous democracy but that  the most 
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important explanation for this phenomenon is not institutional, but rather is an 
effect of lower levels of development and non-democratic political cultures. It is 
true that Mexican political culture as has been characterized as semi-democratic or 
authoritarian, and that it has suffered from lower levels of development (Bartra 
and Otero 2005; Dominguez 2001). And, if democracy is interpreted as meeting 
certain criteria such as competitive elections, protection of civil rights and 
liberties, and due process of law,  it has tended to be sustained when there is the 
presence of a democratic culture and higher levels of development (see Freedom 
House 2006). However, if one interprets democracy as a social democracy, a 
system in which people have the ability to be part of the decision-making 
processes regarding decisions which affect their socioeconomic lives, it can be 
determined that the failures of representative democracy are institutional (Lowy 
and Betto 2003).   
 First of all, active participation in the decision-making process is not open 
to everyone.  The 'decision-making process', in this case refers to people actually 
being able to participate in how policy is formed, not only the decision to vote or 
not. In order to play an active role in major sociopolitical decisions, one has to 
compete in highly competitive 'winner takes all' elections, and shell out mass 
amounts of money and resources for expensive political campaigns (Linz and 
Valenzuela 1994; Ford 2002; Hill 2002).  Thus active participation is reserved for 
elite groups which have the money and resources to compete. Passive participation 
meanwhile is limited to choosing  representatives.  And in the case of Mexico, 
where the president is usually chosen by his successor, this limitation is even more 
apparent ( Linz and Valenzuela 1994).    
 The inability to participate in  political and economic decision-making 
processes often results in voter disillusionment, feelings of helplessness, and being 
faced with choosing the lesser of two evils in elections (Hill 2002).  This has 
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largely contributed to voter apathy.  In countries where other factors such as 
extreme poverty, and marginalization present, it can contribute to violence and 
social unrest. This has been demonstrated by popular uprisings against legally 
elected governments in numerous Latin American states from the late 1990s (Shutt 
2001).   
 Secondly, rule is imposed from the top, where decision-making power is 
placed into one or a group of élite politicians whose priorities often differ from 
those of the people.  Government representatives often assume such positions 
because of personal ties, corporate ties, and personal gains.  There is a lot of 
money to be made and prestige to be earned in such positions of authority.  
Because many leaders are in these positions in order to exploit the system for their 
own gain, they do not adequately represent the wants, needs, and concerns of the 
general electorate, especially not the needs of the indigenous, "unemployed or 
landless multitudes" (Nash 2001: 2; Lowy and Betto 2003).    
 Representatives are far removed from the general electorate, and even local 
government officials tend not to have personal trust ties with the local people they 
are supposedly representing.  Of course, even in countries where the democratic 
culture is strong, such as Switzerland , there’s going to be  a certain amount of 
marginalization the further away you get from trust relationships in politics. But in 
many Latin American countries, where politics tend to be more corrupt, there 
tends to be more of a patern of exploitation and marginalization than  in 
industrialized countries (Shutt 2001).  The dependence on free markets and 
economic globalization makes it virtually impossible to keep things on a small 
enough scale for people to participate meaningfully, or for representatives to 
actually represent their constituencies (Ford 2002;Lowy and Betto 2003; 
Parameswaran 2003).  International financial organizations like the World Bank 
and IMF end up assuming functions that were historically fulfilled by the 
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community, region or state.  When sovereign powers are removed from the local 
and put into the distant bureaucracies, local politics must also be redesigned to 
conform to the rules and practices of those very same distant bureaucracies 
(Canavagh et al. 2002).    
 Thirdly, in most presidential democracies, there seem to be few, if any 
mechanisms to foster a democratic culture based on participation.  This system 
does not provide the general electorate, either through education or information 
campaigns, with information on how they can participate in politics.  People end 
up viewing politics as too complicated because they don't have the necessary 
skills, or know how to obtain the necessary skills in order to take a more active 
role in politics. Also, perceiving that their voice doesn't mean much, even if they 
were to participate, presidential democracy does not give people an incentive to 
get involved.  It ends up being a vicious circle, where the representative system 
lacks mechanisms to provide meaningful participation, and the status quo is 
maintained by an uninformed, uninvolved general electorate (Frey and Stutzer 
2004).  Without these mechanisms, representative democracies can easily become 
dictatorships if the general public does not have the means or know how to check 
their leaders (Li 1999; McCann and Lawson 2003). 
  Fourthly, removal of corrupt or inept  representatives is very difficult, if 
not impossible, making it very difficult to hold politicians into account for their 
actions. Politicians who know that they cannot be removed once in power have 
little incentive to appease the general electorate (Linz and Valenzuela 1994).  
Currently, there are no constitutions in the Spanish and Portuguese speaking 
countries of the Americas in which the head of government can be dismissed from 
office before the end of his or her term, except in "extraordinary circumstances".  
Most constitutions allow for impeachment of the president, but only after finding 
of criminal or unconstitutional conduct, often involving a judicial ruling.  Usually 
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it takes the majority of Congress to remove the president from office.  Such 
procedures have led to only two presidents in Latin American history being 
impeached: Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela in 1993, Fernando Collor de Mello 
in Brazil 1992.(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 18).  
 Fifthly, the rigidity of presidential democracy makes fundamental change 
difficult, if not impossible, and continues to maintain the status quo, and thus, the 
marginalization of peoples.  
 
CHAPTER 7 ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE  
In terms of building a social democracy, where people have control over their own 
socioeconomic lives, direct democracy would seem to be the better of the two 
current options.  However,even in the bodies of fewer than a hundred members, 
pure democracy often does not in practice encourage meaningful widespread 
participation but instead merely serves to "disenfranchise those without the time, 
patience, and dedication required to sit through seemingly endless deliberative 
meetings" (Ford 2002: 1).   
In addition, even in an organization of nontrivial size and complexity there 
are simply too many decisions to be made to expect anyone to participate in all of 
them.  A smaller representative body on the contrary may be more efficient and 
able to act quickly to changing situations, and is much less costly to support.  It 
has been discussed earlier, however, that this can turn into an entrenched group of 
ruling elites.  And it is important point out that, larger bodies have the possibility 
to represent the electorate more accurately and enable voters to have closer 
relationships with their elected representatives (Ford 2002).   
 It is important must keep in mind  that the choice of electoral system, 
popular directives and other cultural factors substantially affect how efficient, 
inefficient, corrupt etc. these systems will be (Ford 2002).  To remedy corruption 
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and entrenchment, for example, certain aspects of direct democracy can be added 
to representative systems by way of voter recalls, popular initiatives, and 
referendum which allows voters to participate in certain important decisions 
directly while leaving the vast majority of the "day-to-day" decisions to elected 
representatives (Ford 2002: 2). According to advocates of representative 
democracy however, it is highly questionable whether most voters can or will take 
the time to study an initiative or referendum in enough detail to make an informed 
decision.  Or in the view of Mill (2004), it is highly questionable whether they are 
intelligent enough to.  Allowing the general electorate to participate in popular 
decision-making processes in this way can make the system much more 
"susceptible to temporary wins, selfish biases and radical or cultural prejudices of 
local or regional majorities than the deliberative decisions made publicly by 
representatives" (Ford 2002:2).  
 So where direct democracy allows for freedom, the same inherent problems 
of concentration of power, corruption and abuse of the system can occur in the 
absence of such mechanisms to prevent this from happening.  We can see that, in 
terms of choosing a democracy which allows for greater participation and reduces 
marginalization, but at the same time does not foster corruption, neither pure direct 
democracy or representative democracy in the liberal sense are adequate.  There is 
a need to find new alternatives which do have such mechanisms. 
 If the ultimate goal is social democracy, then no barriers to citizen 
participation seems to be the fundamental criteria, regardless of whether it is a 
representative or direct democracy, or a combination of the two.  The ideal system 
to accomplish this would be a system which fosters the greatest amount of 
'meaningful' and 'creative' participation across the general electorate. This means 
that people have to abandon the idea that holding elections to choose a 
government every 4 to 6 years represents an adequate expression of the popular 
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will (Shutt 2001).  People need to be able to actively participate and discuss the 
issues.  This also means that people need to be provided with tools to educate 
themselves about the political process (Parameswaran  2003).  If people are 
educated about the political process and know that their vote does count, there will 
be more incentive for people to get involved in the political decision-making 
process ( Feld and Kirchgässner 2000).   
 In addition, there's large consensus that in order for social democracy to 
work, it must also have restricted moneyed interests, mechanisms to hold officials 
to account, restricting patronage ties, and a flexible and dynamic design.  It would 
also need to promote sustainable development, and provide its constituencies with 
basic needs i.e. public health, education and the protection of human rights 
(Canavagh 2002; Shutt 2001; MacEwan 1999; Woodin and Lucas 2004).  In 
particular, preventing those with disproportionate wealth from gaining undue 
influence over the agenda of political parties and over the opinions of voters is 
"the single most important area of reform needed to enhance the quality of 
democracy", in societies where representative government is already well 
established and elsewhere.  According to Shutt (2001: 157), the only "effective 
way of achieving such reform" would be to outlaw any contributions to parties 
funds other than the flat rate subscriptions of members.  
  Reform of the way public servants are appointed or elected, and making 
democratic systems more accountable and representative would require holding 
officials accountable once appointed.  This would involve measures to ensure both 
their commitments and obligations were adhered to, and that no conflict of interest 
or opportunity for personal gain had been introduced or stopped (Shutt 2001:159).   
Officials would have to abstain from the receipt of gifts or any other "gainful 
employment" while in office.   A crucial feature of any system seeking to 
guarantee genuine accountability would be absolute transparency and public 
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access to all information and documents relating to government activities, except 
in certain very limited and clearly defined areas  (Shutt 2001: 159) 
 Restricting political ties to patronage is also a very key mechanisms to 
preventing corruption.  According to Shutt (2001:158), one of the "most 
corrupting features" of contemporary Western democracy is enormous power of 
patronage typically placed in the hands of high officials.  In particular the head of 
the executive branch (as president or prime minister) is generally accorded power 
over hiring and firing the members of the cabinet and other senior officials (Linz 
and Valenzuela 1994).   The only way to rid the system of such corruption would 
be to strip the chief executive of the power to make certain appointments (Shutt 
2001).   This should be seen as a part of a broader effort to encourage those 
politicians who are motivated by public service rather than a personal ambition or 
economic gain.  In other words, holding public office should be seen as a duty 
rather than a privilege (Shutt 2001).    
 To avoid the pitfalls of erosion of sovereignty and citizenship that seem to 
be  an inevitable consequence of economic globalization, there is also strong 
consensus that regardless of the system, governing power should always lie within 
the community. Any decision that can be resolved at the community level should 
be solved there. And the same should apply for the regional, state, and eventually 
national and international levels (Canavagh 2002 ; Shutt 2001; Williamson 2003; 
Woodin and Lucas 2004). There is also a lean towards local currency.  As it stands 
money is seen as a status symbol, where it should be seen as nothing more than a 
mode of exchange.  Although this is a very important topic, it is not within the 
scope of this paper, see Woodin and Lucas (2004). 
 Critics of localization, that is local economy, and strengthened local 
governments,  fear that it may bring threats to human rights or encourage 
autocracy. Of course localization provides no guarantee of democracy or 
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protection of human rights, but makes them far more likely  as smaller 
communities offer much greater access to sources of power. Corporate 
globalization on the other hand is centralized, undemocratic, and destructive to 
community and their own ability to participate in democracy.  The area of human 
rights is one which international agreements can continue to play a useful role 
(Canavagh 2002; Woodin and Lucas 2004).   
 Lastly, it is very important to be sensitive to the cultural, geographical, and 
other factors when creating a government system.  There is not one-size-fits-all 
governing system which can be applied to all situations in all societies, something 
that the World Bank failed to recognize with their Structural Adjustment Programs 
(Demmers et.al 2004).  Government structures should be flexible, dynamic and 
custom made to every situation in order to best fit the group it is designed to 
govern (Ford 2002). 
 In theory, delegative democracy has the potential to fulfill all of these 
criteria.  As everyone can be a delegate, there is no barrier to participation. and no 
expensive political campaigns.  Becoming a delegate does not by itself confer any 
representative power, it only indicates a willingness to act on behalf of others and 
a commitment to play a direct rule in the operation of the organization and take 
responsibilities for decisions made (Ford  2002).: It can of course arise that 
popular delegates could become quite visible.  However this is dwarfed in 
comparison to the prestige awarded to heads of states (Mainwaring and Shugart 
1997; Linz and Valenzuela 1994) .  As delegates, power is ultimately vested in the 
delegates themselves.  It is based on trust relationships at the local level, but it 
seems that it can be used at the municipal, regional and possibly the even state 
level as well.  Delegative democracy has ultimately no barriers to participation.  It 
is flexible and dynamic, and it can be adapted to virtually any type of organization 
(Ford 2002).  It has the potential to be sustainable and provide the basic needs for 
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people, if that is what the general population agrees upon.  Delegative democracy 
seems to be a viable alternative in theory, but can delegative democracy be reality?  
The next section will compare and contrast the Zapatista model with delegative 
democracy theory in order to see how similar the two systems are and if the 
Zapatistas system can be viewed as delegative democracy in practice. 
 
6.1  The Zapatista Model: Delegative Democracy in Practice   
According to my findings, The Zapatista model is a very close approximation of 
what delegative democracy is, with a few minor differences.  Which in some ways 
made the Zapatista model more practical, but at the same time delegative 
democracy seems to have the possibility of  being used in many more situations 
than the Zapatista model can.  This will be discussed later in regard to applying the 
Zapatista model to other societies. 
 In delegative democracy, there are theoretically no barriers to participation.  
Anyone meeting certain "basic qualifications" can become a delegate.  In the 
Zapatista system, there doesn't even seem to be such a criteria.  In two interviews 
with the JBG, they explained that there are no required qualifications to be a 
delegate.  This even includes language requirements.  This seemed a bit strange, 
seeing as how there are many Zapatistas who speak various Mayan languages, and 
many who do not speak Spanish (observation Oventic, Emiliano Zapata; San 
Cristóbal; De Garracha Jan.-March 2006).  It seem that this could be a major 
barrier to communication, but the Zapatista government officials offered assurance 
that it wasn't a problem so far.  There is a course that delegates must take in order 
to learn how to govern, however this course is available to anyone (JBG De 
Garracha Feb 2006; JBG Oventic March 2006).  All of the members of each 
Zapatista community are encouraged to participate in all of  functions of the 
Zapatista autonomous municipalities, i.e. health, education (EZLN Jan 2006).   
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 Like delegative democracy, the Zapatista system is founded on real 
personal and group trust relationships.  Delegative democracy stipulates that, in 
order to maximize the chance that individual voters will be able to find delegates 
to which they have personal trust relationships, there should be no fixed limit to 
the total number of delegates. This can actually be a disadvantage in large 
organizations and countries where the body of delegates could grow into the 
millions.  And paying full-time salaries to so many delegates would be unrealistic. 
This differs from the Zapatista system which does limit the amount of delegate 
positions, and delegates work on a volunteer basis so they do not represent an 
economic burden on the communities (JBG De Garracha Feb. 2006; JBG Oventic 
March 2006).  Because the delegates represent communities and not individuals, 
there seems to be less of a need for everyone to fulfill the position of a delegate.  
This by no means however limits Zapatista citizens from getting involved.  There 
are three different levels of civil government, and many opportunities to 
participate.  Participating in the JBG is a bit limited,as there are only 24 delegates 
chosen for each region every three years. However, anyone expressing in need or 
want to become a member of the JBG is invited to do so.  Those who, because of 
limited spaces, are not able to be a delegate on the JBG, can still be municipal or 
community council members. And because power lies in the community, these 
positions are considered just as important.  Everyone is encouraged to participate 
on all levels of civil government, and in all of the different areas in which the 
MAREZ works i.e. health, education (JBG De Garracha 2006; JBG Oventic 
2006). 
 In a delegative democracy, each member of the electorate is independently 
given the choice of participating actively in the organization by becoming a 
delegate, or participating passively by delegating their individual vote to a 
delegate.  In the Zapatista system however delegates are chosen by communities 
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instead of individuals, but the logic is the same.  Each delegate has a "weighted" 
power depending on how many people delegate their votes to them, or in the case 
of the Zapatistas the size of their communities (Subcommandante Marcos 2003:1; 
JBG Oventic 2006). Communities range from about 12 to 100 families, and 
anywhere from 40 people to 400. If one community had 300 members for 
example, then the delegate would have a weight of 300 (Ford 2002; JBG March 
2006).    
 Because there's no way to limit the amount of voting power that one 
delegate can have in delegative democracy, certain disparities will undoubtedly 
emerge among the different delegates.  Ford  (2002) doesn't see this as a problem 
as long as the disparities represent the will of the people.  The chance of the 
emergence of disparities however in the Zapatista system is much less because 
voter power is limited to the size of their community (Subcommandante Marcos 
2003).  Thus there are much clearer boundaries set on the collective power that 
delegates have, without restricting their freedom.   
 Like delegative democracy, the primary power structures in the Zapatista 
government are bottom-up, both voters and delegates are free to withdraw their 
vote from delegates at any time and designate them to another if they so wish. This 
seems quite similar to the Zapatistas notion of governing by obeying.  Governing 
by obeying also seems to mitigate problems of internal corruption and 
misrepresentation which can arise under a delegative system (Ford 2002). 
Delegates are also free to choose their own level of participation in order to 
prevent being overwhelmed or overburdened. The Zapatistas have found a clever 
way to balance both their civil lives and their political duties by permitting 
delegates work in weekly or biweekly rotations. This allows delegates more time 
with their other work and with their families (JBG De Garracha February 2006; 
JBG Oventic March 2006). 
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Sustainable Development 
As mentioned before delegative democracy can provide a platform for sustainable 
development, if that is what the general electorate desires. The Zapatistas have 
made sustainable development an important pillar of their society.  Many of their 
sustainable development projects started after NAFTA allowed for heavily 
subsidized corn from the USA, which forced local farmers to sell their corn 
harvests for less than what they cost to produce, and self subsistence farmers were 
only producing one third of the corn needed to subsist. One of the Zapatistas major 
goals at this time was to find farming techniques that use no inputs from the 
market, chemical or otherwise, and to develop sustainable production adequate for 
peoples' subsistence and without any reliance on neoliberal markets, thereby 
combining autonomy with resistence. The end result was a focus on 
“agroecology”(Collier and Quaratiello 2005: 197).  
 Agroecology is the term to describe “the approach to sustainable and 
preferably organic agriculture”(Collier and Quaratiello 2005: 197).  Thus far, the 
Zapatistas have created Mut Vitz Coffee Cooperative, that grows organic coffee 
which they sell directly to international solidarity groups, avoiding the middle 
man, and making prices for their crop often more favorable than even 'fair trade' 
coffee(EZLN January 2006; Collier and Quaratiello 2005: 197). Their use of both 
traditional and organic cultivation for both coffee and corn has also been a 
success. The Zapatistas are currently planning many other agroecological projects 
including horticulture of vegetables, and raising animals on organic feed (Collier 
and Quaratiello 2005).  Some of the Zapatistas have solar panels to produce 
electricity, but solar panels can be very expensive and are not available to all 
communities (Zapatista Citizen E. 2006).  Their communal living produces very 
little consumption, and thus very little waste. In 1996 the Enlace Civil or Civic 
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Network was established in the Municipio de Trabajo (Municipality of Work) to 
advise projects of education, health, production and commercialization all outside 
of the neoliberal framwork (Collier and Quaratiello 2005).  
  
Mechanisms for Creating an Informed Electorate 
The Zapatista movement is based on providing mechanisms to teach people about 
politics and how they can get involved.  Since one of their major goals is solidarity 
and educating people on how to be self-sustaining communities,  the Zapatista 
government and EZLN are constantly informing people about what is going on 
locally and throughout Mexico in terms of politics (observation in various areas of 
Chiapas Jan-March 2006).   
 Their government has mechanisms to insure that the task of governing is 
not exclusive to one group, so that learning is for the greatest number of people. 
This serves to reduce corruption, prevent power from being concentrated, and give 
all members of their society an opportunity to directly participate in local 
government.  Any Zapatista can contribute to governance, and it is not prevented 
by gatekeepers or family ties.  Unlike the caciques, who can be easily controlled 
by local state officials trying to gain voter support, the Zapatistas refuse all state 
funding (JBG 2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003) . 
 Very interestingly, in the autonomous schools they teach ‘social movement’ 
within the Humanities discipline.  In this way, children are actually socialized 
from a very young to be critical to the government, and to know their rights, and to 
know that that they have a right, and even a duty to get involved in politics 
(Zapatista school official 2006). 
The Zapatistas encourage participation and it is socialized within their 
philosophy of learning by governing (see Findings, Government Structure). The 
fact that the Zapatistas know that their voice will be heard on different matters, are 
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provided with incentives to get more involved in the decision-making process 
(EZLN January 2006).   
 In summary, it is apparent that Zapatista autonomy is providing better for 
the people than the neglectful, oppressive Mexican state. The Zapatistas have 
come up with revolutionary ways of governing which have taken the primary 
provisionary and government role where before, there was none to be found.  The 
Zapatistas support bases have grown immensely over the past decades, partly due 
to their ability to be social provisionary, but also because of their ability to provide 
a space for dialogue, local government, and civil law among sometimes starkly 
divided communities.  The latter can be viewed as a great accomplishment in that 
the lack of these mechanisms contributes to why many Latin American countries 
have not been able to govern their highly plural, and often internally divided 
societies (Mindiola 2006).   
 These local systems are working better, from a social democratic source on 
the Python yeah the point of view,  however even in light of its new liberal 
democracy status, Mexico is not embracing these systems.  In the federal 
government's defense, it is claiming that if they were to implement the San 
Andreas accords, allowing for the Zapatistas and others to have autonomous rights 
(the accords grant autonomous rights not separatism or anarchy) it would create a 
virtual "balkanization" of the state (Grayson 2001:1).  Others argue that their de 
facto status, with no single constitution other than the San Andreas accords to bind 
them will make it very difficult for the extension and the function of these 
autonomies (Eber 2006; Meneses 2006; Cal y Mayor 2005).  In the next section , 
this paper will discuss why the Zapatista self-government model is not in conflict 
with the concept of the nation state, and in fact complements its functions.   
 
CHAPTER 8 CRITICISMS 
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A State within the State?  Autonomy Versus Separatism 
George Grayson, a 'specialist' on contemporary Mexico argues that "local 
autonomy can enable the strong to suppress the weak in a state riven with myriad 
feuds ." He suggests that the adoption of the indigenous practices known as "uses 
and customs" or usos y costumbres "could find elders dictating how villagers vote, 
as well as continued male dominance over females at a time when Mexico is 
making unprecedented democratic advances"(Grayson 2001: 1).  
 Grayson's argument does have merit, as the adoption of usos y costumbres 
in Oaxaca has led to problems within practicing communities in several areas. 
There is an increasing awareness of the existence of political exclusion registered 
in municipalities ruled by customary practices and law. Indeed, despite the values 
of equality and solidarity that (theoretically) guide the exercise of public authority 
in these towns, the usos y costumbres regime denies the full extension of  
citizenship rights. Although the nature and type of denial of citizenship rights 
varies across municipalities, in general, the sectors excluded are women, 
"avecindados" (newcomers), and individuals born in the municipality who do not 
live there (radicados). Women do not vote in 18% of the municipalities in which 
municipal elections are ruled by usos y costumbres and newcomers are 
disenfranchised at around 30%. Therefore, although these exclusions to political 
participation do not occur elsewhere (or to the same degree), in the most 
exclusionary of these municipalities there is a real threat to the principle of 
equality of rights. Indeed, the exclusion of political rights to important sectors of 
the population has been pointed out as a nondemocratic feature of the system 
(Moreno Jaimes 2006: 7) 
 In addition to problems of political exclusion, lack of mechanisms of post-
electoral conflict resolution have led to an increasing number of conflicts within 
societies ruled by uses and customs. Oaxaca State Electoral institute now faces the 
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challenge of helping municipalities ruled by usos y costumbres to solve their post-
electoral conflicts in an "effective, non-disruptive, peaceful way". According to 
Moreno Jaimes a "new institutional reform might even be necessary to provide 
them with mechanisms of conflict resolution in cases of post-electoral 
disputes"(Moreno Jaimes 2006: 7).  
 So Grayson is correct in saying that certain indigenous practices including 
those in Oaxaca are flawed in their implementation.  However, Grayson's 
comments show his ignorance of the Zapatista way of doing, as he has not 
differentiated between the two systems.  He is directly comparing the system of 
uses and customs with the Zapatista model, and ignoring the fact that their 
governing practices are fundamentally different.  For example, unlike Oaxaca 
which has an hierarchical system through their Indian Chiefs or elders called 
caciques, the Zapatista model is not hierarchical.  As mentioned before, there are 
no special qualifications, or requirements that one needs to be a member of any 
level of civil government, the community, municipal, or regional. The members of 
the Good Government Juntas change continually, allowing the JBG's to be rotated 
among the members of all the autonomous councils of each region.  This is so that 
the task of governing is not exclusive to one group, that there are no ‘professional’ 
leaders, and that learning is for the greatest number of people. This serves to 
reduce corruption, prevent power from being concentrated, and give all members 
of their society an opportunity to directly participate in local government.  Thus, 
any Zapatista can contribute to governance, and it is not prevented by gatekeepers 
or family ties.  Unlike the caciques, who can be easily controlled by local state 
officials trying to gain voter support, the Zapatistas refuse all state funding (JBG 
2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003) . 
 In terms of democracy and participation of women, "safeguards were 
included in the San Andrés agreement to ensure that constitutional guarantees 
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were not weakened in particular with regard to human rights and the dignity of 
women" (Saramago 1999:1).  In fact the Zapatistas coined the Revolutionary Law 
On Women in the San Andrés Accords, and it is required by law that women make 
up 50% of the positions of the JBG (EZLN 2006; Subcommandante Marcos 2003; 
Dominguez 2001) 
 Unlike the system in Oaxaca, the Zapatistas themselves have a conflict 
resolution mechanism already in place and don't have to rely on outside mediators.  
They encourage people to solve their problems with dialogue as opposed to 
violence.  In fact, the the Zapatistas JBG is gaining so much legitimacy, andtheir 
conflict resolution mechanism is working so well, that the Chiapas state 
government and municipal governments even come to them to resolve problems in 
Zapatista jurisdiction (Subcommandante Marcos 2003).    
 Grayson also argues that self-determination can create a "state within a 
state," as municipalities demand control of minerals, timber, and water resources 
located within their boundaries. Even if handled responsibly in Chiapas, autonomy 
would "excite cries for similar treatment in the nine other states" where indigenous 
people constitute 14 percent or more of the population, a process that skeptics 
insist would "Balkanize" the country (Grayson 2001: 1).  It is true that one of the 
key elements of indigenous governance is the self-determination of peoples, of 
which the practical expression is autonomy (not separatism) based on a 
"regulatory system that organizes the social life" (Mindiola However autonomy, as 
understood by the Zapatistas and the San Andres accords, is in no way a 
synonynym for secession or separatism.  
The  Zapatistas definition of autonomy incorporates more than just self-
determination, it also means the rights to celebrate and be proud of one's identity 
and culture, language etc. In other words, being able to determine and maintain 
their own worldview and not conform to the dominant worldview and being able 
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to practice their own customs, cultures, governing practices, conflict resolution 
mechanisms and rule of law.  The  Zapatistas would like a "world where all worlds 
fit" (EZLN 2006) 
 According to the San Andrés Accords, autonomy does not imply that the 
state will stop having responsibility with the new levels of organization, which 
will have the right to public compensation from and others that are due to 
indigenous peoples. The accords were drafted in order to comply with the federal 
and state constitutions and the laws emerging from them. Quite contrary to 
Grayson's belief, the San Andrés Accords call for the establishment of "general 
foundations that may insure unity and  national objectives" while at the same time 
allowing federal entities the "true power  to legislate and act in accordance to  the 
particularities of the indigenous  issues coming before them" (San Andrés Accords 
1996; 1).  
 In terms of demanding control over minerals and natural resources, the 
Zapatistas view access to such resources as a human right.  In other words, 
resources should be used in the best possible way to benefit the public.  This does 
not mean that the public will have 100% control over all the resources without 
allowing other people in Mexico to benefit, but they do demand having a say in 
the matter of how these  resources are distributed (Subcommandante Marcos 2003; 
EZLN January 2006).     
  Although not implementing the San Andres Accords, Mexico has ratified 
and officially recognizes the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 
169/89 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. Thus, Mexico 
constitutionally recognizes the rights of these peoples, and their system of 
customary practices and laws as one of their collective rights. Nevertheless, the 
"prevailing legal monism" not only breaches the ILO Convention but also 
obstructs the functioning of a "parallel, indigenous normative system, thus 
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generating social conflicts" (Mindiola 2006:1). 
 Mexico's unwillingness implement the San Andreas accords that recognize 
the rights of indigenous people is evidence that they do not consider these de facto 
autonomous projects as a viable solution to indigenous governance and democracy 
in Mexico, despite the fact that they seem to be working for the Zapatistas.  Some 
see this is a major impediment to the future of the Zapatista movement and believe 
that if they are not able to cooperate with the state, and become de jure as opposed 
to de facto autonomy, the system is doomed to failure.  The next section will 
discuss de facto versus de jure autonomy, and explore the Zapatista view on 
whether they should give up their de facto 'autonomies in rebellion' status. 
 
De Facto Autonomy? 
The Zapatista uprising led to internal violence, fractionalized towns, divided 
communities, divided families and indeed a debilitated EZLN (Cal y Mayor 2005: 
240 ). According to many members of Mexican civil society and scholars alike, 
the Zapatistas need to change from autonomy de facto to autonomy de jure 
(Menenses 2006; Chiapas NGO official 1 2006).  According to Cal y Mayor 
(2005), the Zapatistas need to work with the state, and reform their constitutional 
reforms of 2001 because up until now, their model of autonomy only includes 
them.  He believes that the autonomous Zapatista projects should be more 
inclusive and pleural, and permit the reconstruction of the towns in respect of 
diversity (Cal y Mayor 2005). 
 This is no easy task as the villages of Chiapas are "profoundly divided by 
violence in the midst of diversification and globalization "(Cal y Mayor 2005: 
241).  The creation of the Junta of Good Government could be a step in the right 
direction if the Zapatista program is able to realize their actual goals.  Cal y Mayor 
believes that as long as they continue in the path of de facto autonomy and not 
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autonomy de jure, they're going to be plagued with internal confrontations, and 
conflicts (Cal y Mayor 2005). Currently, the different Zapatista support bases are 
living under their own rules, which do not always coincide with each other. Of 
course they all adhere to the ILO and San Andrés accords, but they are free to 
govern their own communities as they see fit. The Zapatistas do not accept any 
government money, and they go is an even as far as not registering births and 
deaths with the state (Salmonelli 2005).  If the Zapatistas start living in de jure 
autonomy, it will no longer be territory in resistance, a transition which many view 
as grave to the Zapatista movement and their virtues (Menenses 2006; Chiapas 
NGO official 1 2006).  Cal y Mayor sees this is the biggest weakness, and the 
ultimate cost and sacrifice and fragmentation of the communities and internal 
members (Cal y Mayor 2005: 241).   
 These are valid concerns, however the Zapatistas seem to be managing 
quite well considering the circumstances. They're not waiting for the government 
to give them "charity and speeches"(Subcommandante Marcos 2003: one).  They 
are working to improve their living conditions, and they are achieving that(see 
section on MAREZ).  Paradoxically, their conditions, although still a long way 
from being ideal, are better than those communities which are receiving federal 
aid.  And this can be confirmed through visiting the communities 
(Subcommandante Marcos 2003; observation Las Tacitas, Emeliano Zapata, 
Oventic, De Garrucha 2006) 
 In terms of the Zapatistas de facto status being weakness, their communities 
in rebellion status seems to actually be promoting solidarity among the different 
support bases (Zapatista citizen E., J. , V.,  R. , G. 2006).  The San Andrés 
Accords, as we see in the discussion on a State within a State, is already inclusive 
and pleural.  True, one of the Zapatistas most challenging jobs is to remain flexible 
and responsive to "the local realities of each community," and directives coming 
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from the Zapatista leadership are not always workable within certain communities 
(Eber 2006). But they should not necessarily be viewed as a weakness.  It has in a 
way, made the Zap6atista civil government very flexible, dynamic and open to 
change. And the fact that they are still here, and their support groups continue to 
grow is evidence that it is working (observation, throughout Mexico 2006; 
Subcommandante Marcos 2003).   
 The nature of the strong presidential system, governmental corruption, and 
concentration of corporate power has made it virtually impossible for de jure 
autonomy and self-government.  The government continues to exclude them from 
the decision-making process of policies which profoundly affect their lives.   
A prime example being the government approval of a new $ 8 billion free trade 
agreement (the Plan Puebla-Panama-PPP) that would profoundly affect the lives of 
thousands of indigenous people,  without consulting major indigenous 
constituencies (Pickard 2004).   
 Exclusion of the majority of indigenous people and in the forming and 
implementing of state and national policies that affect their lives still a reality in 
Mexico.  The Zapatistas provide their citizens with the ability to make decisions 
within their areas of limited control. However, if they were to become de jure 
autonomies, they they would essentially be co-opted by the state meaning essence 
that they accept going back into the same poverty and servitude that they have 
been in before the uprising.  Therefore, the autonomies in rebellion represent 
something far larger than the uprising itself.  They have started to question the 
legitimacy and legality of the state's own institutions.  
 The Zapatistas denounce their exclusion, discrimination and their 
oppression, and do not believe that new negotiations with the state will come to 
any good (EZLN March 2006).  It seems obvious from the federal government's 
unwillingness to implement the San Andreas accords that they do not take these 
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projects seriously and they will insist on maintaining the status quo.  In the 
Zapatista view, the "institutional system has been exhausted [...] all  political 
parties and the bureaucratic elite are a bunch of traitors, and the three main doors-
executive, Legislature, Judiciary-are closed" (Bartra and Otero 2001: 405).  
 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS   
1. liberal democracy is not synonymous with social democracy  
One of the largest problems with liberal democracy in Mexico is that it does not 
have mechanisms to prevent the concentration of power through its elected 
officials.  Due to Mexico's dependence on the Bretton Woods institutions, 
government policymakers are even more sensitive to the demands of corporations.  
Those who end up being the main beneficiaries of liberal democracy are 
Corporation and big business.   
 Even when one controls for all of the factors which qualify a state to be a 
liberal democracy (i.e. egalitarian institutions, fairn  elections, etc.), there is still 
concentration of power in just a few hands.  Corruption and marginalization can 
still arise because of the underlying neoliberal free-market agenda, which is 
flawed in many ways. The most fundamental being that it values corporate interest 
over the public good, which has contributed to a long list of negative social 
impacts (Korten 2001; Shutt 2001; Woodin and Lucas 2004). In addition to 
contributing to the erosion of state sovereignty and citizenship, it is expansionist, 
rigid, and locks out other alternatives for democracy (Demmers et.al 2004; 
Hogenboom 2004; MacEwan 1999; Korten 2001).  The effects of this oppressive 
and exploitative system are felt even more profoundly in Third World countries, 
where the accumulation of loan debt has increased their dependence on neoliberal 
lending institutions (Demmers et al. 2004).  
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2.The Zapatista model has the potential of being a viable democratic alternative to 
liberal democracy in Mexico  
It has been discussed that the Zapatistas have been able to fulfill all of the criteria 
deemed to be necessary for having a social democracy, although this is limited to 
regional governance within their areas of influence.  In order to be a viable 
democratic alternative to liberal democracy,  it would arguably need to find ways 
to adapt to the state and national levels of governing, as representative democracy 
currently allows. One of the main contradictions I see would be cultural problems, 
namely the conflict between communal rights versus individual rights, and their 
deliberate practices, where the discussion is often just as important if not more 
than an outcome (Flood 1999).   
 The Zapatista model is a natural occurring phenomenon that was developed 
from the underlying need of a local government.  It has been adapted so that it can 
be used at several levels of government, but the underlying forces which drive this 
system are largely culturally related and need-based.  This would seem to make it 
very difficult to try to use their model in circumstances which differ culturally and 
circumstantially from their own.  Some see a conflict between collective rights and 
individual rights (Grayson 2001).  However, collective rights like the decision as 
to the use of natural resources, are not only not in contradiction of individual 
rights, but communal rights allow these resources to be extended everyone, not 
just to a few.  In the advances that have been made in the MAREZ, there has been 
no increase in the violation of individual human rights.  What has increased are 
better living conditions (Subcommandante Marcos 2003:1). The Zapatistas nurture 
participation and work for the common good.  And anyone of the Caracols you 
can be a sign that says "para todos todo, para nosotros nada" which means for all, 
everything for us, nothing." Though this may seem like a bit of an abstract 
thought, it means that no few will benefit at the cost of the many.  But on the 
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contrary, everyone will have everything.    
In terms of government design, delegative democracy, which the Zapatista 
model is based on, can be used in both community settings, as we see int he 
Zapatistas, but the original premis was that it would vest ultimate voting and 
delegating power into individuals themselves.   
 
3. The Zapatista model does not need to be applied to state and national level as 
ultimate power should be invested in the community 
According to participatory democracy theory, alternatives for a sustainable future, 
ultimate sovereignty should lie in the community, not the state and not the nation 
(Woodin and Lucas 2004)   In this sense, the Zapatistas are one step ahead of the 
competition.  But this doesn't change the fact that we live in a globalized world, 
and the majority of people who are not already living in communal situations do 
not seem too eager to give up their material possessions, jobs, and their way of life 
to go back to farming the land.  Even many indigenous people who have been 
removed from the communal society do not want to go back (Chiapas Department 
of Education official 2006; NGO official 2006).   
 A shift back to the local does not necessarily mean a shift to the Stone Age.  
The Zapatistas themselves realize the importance of being compatible with, but 
not dependent on economic global forces.  Though even with their self-sustaining 
economies, the Zapatistas are not 100% immune from engaging in commerce on 
an international level.  The main difference is they choose the rules of how they 
will market their products themselves at the price they choose, as opposed to 
following the rules set by some far removed global financial institutions (Collier 
And Quaratiello 2005).  This idea of local economy and local government does 
have the potential to work, and it doesn't necessarily mean that people can't go on 
living in similar ways than they are now.  The big difference is that people will 
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have more control over their social economic lives (Williamson 2003; Woodin and 
Lucas 2004).   
4. People do not need elite rule 
There are extensive arguments in support of the necessity for representative 
democracy in the form that it takes today ( Mill 2004; Schumpeter 1950). A 
fundamental one being that the general electorate is not intelligent or informed 
enough to rule themselves. Another is, that without professional, skilled 
representatives, society would fall apart into autocracies void of civil law.  But 
obviously this is false. The Zapatistas are a living breathing example of 
academically uneducated, nonprofessionals, non-leaders that are ruling themselves 
better than a makeshift Mexican liberal democracy could ever hope to do.  Where 
the state and national representatives have worked to make divisions between 
different indigenous and mestizo groups to guarantee maintenance of the political 
status quo, the Zapatistas are working to heal the wounds created by a history of 
authoritarian rule.  They believe in using dialogue, information campaigns, and 
solidarity to further their cause.  Though the Zapatistas maintain their de facto 
rebellion status, sometimes even state officials come to the Zapatistas for help in 
dealing with certain problems like the rule of law in their jurisdiction (JBG March 
2006; Hidalgo Feb 2006). 
 It is apparent that the farther government moves from local self-governance 
and trust relationships the less 'representative' representatives will be.  An 
increasing global environment driven by economic forces renders politicians even 
more far removed from their constituencies.  It is concluded that Presidentialism is 
a form of representative democracy which is especially susceptible to corporate 
manipulation due to lack of mechanisms to prevent the concentration of corporate 
power.  Representative democracy  together with an all-powerful, unaccountable, 
unrestrained market economy allows market interests to dwarf the interests of the 
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public.  As discussed in the case study of the Zapatistas, citizens do a much better 
job of ruling themselves than far removed representatives, who may not, and often 
do not possess the same values or perceive the world in the same way as the ones 
that they are supposedly representing. On the contrary, Zapatista government 
relationships are based on trust and the power ultimately lies in the community, so 
officials better know how to address the needs of their public (Eber 2006; Hidalgo 
2006).   
5.In most societies, the move to autonomous self-government would involve major 
revolutionary changes in the existing power relations, in politics, in economics, 
and ethics of the society (MacEwan 1999;Parameswaran 2004).  In order to make 
the transition towards a true social democracy, where people have control over 
their own economic, political and social lives, there needs to be a force strong 
enough to significantly alter political culture to provide a paradigm shift.   Thus, a 
critical component to this new democracy would be emphasis on solidarity and 
education.  
The Zapatistas point out that although their system is working for them, 
their solution is not the only answer to social democracy.  Every community, state, 
nation etc. is unique and any governing system should be flexible, dynamic, and 
sensitive to local idiosyncrasies.  In order for democracy to be realized, it must be 
realized in one's own way, not by artificially imposed representation structures and 
unaccountable free markets. 
6. Indigenous people are an important source for democratization and change 
Rigid representative democracy systems such as presidentialism, make it difficult 
for real change to occur through representative politics, and it lacks the 
mechanisms to educate the general electorate.  For real change to occur, it seems 
apparent that any mobilization towards a social democracy would need to be done 
from the grassroots level, working with solidarity, and providing a mechanisms for 
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the educating and encouraging citizens to use the economic and political rights.  
This is exactly what the Zapatistas are doing and few would dispute the fact that 
there are powerful external source for democratization in Mexico  because of this  
(Eber 2006; Bartra Otero 2005; Collier, Collie). According to Nash (2001:3)  
 
"Social movements generated by people deprived of their subsistence resources, gainful employment, and 
those marginalized or excluded from commodity markets in which to sell their products, appeal to morality 
more often than the rational calculus of surplus value extortion.” 
 
The Zapatistas as well as other indigenous groups in Mexico have found important 
allies in NGOs concerned with issues of human rights and environmental damage, 
and poverty reduction. This is bridging a gap between international civil society 
and often misunderstood and misrepresented indigenous peoples. It is in these 
“transnational spaces” that new forms of governments are starting to emerge 
which may enable the human species to survive in a globally integrated world that 
permits alternative ways of coexistence and survival (Nash 2001:3).   
 
Sources 
Bartra, Armando, and Otero, Gerardo (2005) "Indian Peasant Movements in Mexico: the Struggle for 
Land, Autonomy and Democracy" in Moyo, Sam and Yeros, Paris (2005) Reclaiming the Land: A 
Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  London and New York: Zed Books 
 
Boyer, Robert. 2000. "Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A  
preliminary analysis", Economy and Society, Vol.29, 1:111-145.  
 
Bruhn, Kathleen (1999) “Antonio Gramsci and the palabra verdadera: The political discourse of 
Mexico's guerrilla forces”Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Summer 1999    
 
Coldwell,Joaquin "La autonomia no es balcanizacion" La Jornada 8 November 1997 
 
Cavanagh, John et al. (2002) "A Better World I s Pos s i b l e ! Alternatives To Economic Globalization" 
The International Forum on Globalization (IFG) (May 2, 2006) [Online].-URL: 
http://www.ifg.org/alt_eng.pdf  
 
Center for Economic and Political Investigation for Community Action (CIEPAC) and Chiapas media 
Project (2003) WTO: A Threat to Humanity. Documentary film 
 
Collier George A. and Jane F.(2005)" the Zapatista Rebellion in the Context of Globalization" The 
 98
Journal of Peasant Studies Special Issue on Rural Chiapas 10 Years after the Zapatista Uprising Vol.  No.  
3-4 2005: 451-460 
 
Collier, George A. and Lowery Quaratiello (2005) Basta! Land in the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas. 
Oakland, California  Food First Books 
 
CONAPAZ (1997) Militarization in Chiapas 
 
Demmers, Jolle, Fernández Jilberto, Alex E. and Hogenboom, Barbara (2004) Good Governance and 
Democracy in the World of Neoliberal Regimes" in Good Governance in the Era of Global 
Neoliberalism: Conflict and Depoliticization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.  London 
and New York: Routledge 
 
Dominguez, Edme (2001) "Citizenship and Women in Mexico: Searching for a New Political Culture? 
Views and experiences of participants and non-participants and political action" 
in N.  Kabeer (ed.), Discussing women's. empowerment: theory  and practice  Stockholm: 88-113 
 
Dowling,Mike "the Electronic Passport to Ancient Greece"  
(June 20, 2006) [Online].-URL:  http://www.mrdowling.com/zip/701greece.pdf 
 
EZLN (1994) "First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle" (November 20, 2005) [Online].-URL:  
 http://www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/199312xx.en.htm 
 
Feld, Lars P. and Kirchgässner, Gebhard (2000) "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of 
economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience"  European Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 16, 
2000: 287–306 (July 20, 2006) [Online].-URL:  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi 
 
Fisher, William S. and Ponniah, Thomas Et Al. (2003) Another World Is Possible: Popular Alternatives 
to Globalization At the World Social Forum. Nova Scotia:  Fernwood Publishing Ltd .   
 
Flood, Andrew (1999) "The Zapatistas and Direct Democracy", Anarcho-Syndicalist  Review, #27 Winter 
1999 (May 1, 2005) [Online].-URL: http://www.syndicalist.org/archives/asr25-30 
 
Ford, Bryan "Delegative Democracy" (July 1, 2006) [Online].-URL: 
http://www.brynosaurus.com/deleg/deleg.pdf 
 
Freedom House (2006) "Selected Data From Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties"   (June 1, 2006) [Online] -URL: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/Charts2006.pdf 
 
Frey, Bruno and Stutzer, Alois (2004) "The Role of Direct Democracy and Federalism in Local Power" 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich 
Working Paper No. 209 October 2004 (July 30, 2006) [Online].-URL:  
 http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp209.pdf 
 
Gilbreath,Chris and Otero, Gerardo (2001) "Democratization in Mexico, The Zapatista Uprising and Civil 
Society" Latin American Perspectives  Issue 119, Vol. 28 No. 4, July 2001: 7-29 
 99
 
Grayson, George (2001) "How to Deal with Mexico’s Zapatistas" January  29, 2001 (July 1, 2006) 
[Online].-URL: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/latin.20010129.grayson.zapatistas.html 
 
Gutteridge, William Et Al. (1997) Latin America and the Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy.  
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
 
Hagene,Turid (2003) “Nicaragua in the 20th Century: 100 Years of Patronage”, in Latinomérica. Anuario 
De Estudios Latinoamericanos, No. 36, 2003: 137-139 
 
Held,  David et.al (1999), "Global  Transformations" Politics, Economics  and Culture. Stanford, 
California: Stanford  University press. 
 
Hill, Stephen (2002) Fixing Elections, the Failure of America's Winner Take All Politics.  New York and 
London: Routledge 
 
Hogenboom, Barbara (2004) "Governing Mexico's market democracy" in Good Governance and 
Democracy in the World of Neoliberal Regimes" in Good Governance in the Era of Global 
Neoliberalism: Conflict and Depoliticization in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. London 
and New York: Routledge 
 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatika (INEGI) 
XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000 (July 16, 2006) [Online].-URL:  
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/proyectos/censos/cpv2000/ 
 
 Johannessen, Asbjørn, et.al (2004) Indtroduksjon Til Samfunnsvitenskapelig Metode.Oslo:Abstrakt 
Forlag AS   
 
Johnston, Josée (2000) "Pedagogical  Guerrillas, Armed Democrats,  and Revolutionary Counterpublics:  
Examining Paradox in the Zapatista Unprising  in Chiapas Mexico", Theory  and Society  Vol. 29, No. 4: 
463-505  
 
Korten, David C. (2001) When Corporations Rule the World. USA:Kumarian Press  
Li, Bo (1999) "Representative  Government and Democracy"  Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 3 OYCF (July 1, 
2006) [Online] URL: http://www.Oycf.org/Perspectives/3_123199/Representative_Government.htm 
 
Linz, Juan J. and Valenzuela, Arturo Et Al. (1994) The Failure of Presidential Democracy.  London: The 
Johns Hopkins Press Ltd. 
 
Lupia, Arthur and Matsusaka, John G. (2004) "Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old  Questions" 
Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 7: 463-482 May 2004 (July 1, 2006) [Online] URL: 
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci  
 
MacEwan, Arthur (1999) Neoliberalism or Democracy?  Economic Strategy, Markets, and Alternatives 
for the 21st Century. London and New York: Zed Books  
 
Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew Soperg (1997) Presidentialism And Democracy in Latin 
America. New York: Cambridge University Press 
 100
 
Manville B. and J. Ober 2003, A Company of Citizens : What the World's First Democracy Teaches 
Leaders about Creating Great Organizations. Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
 
McCann, James A. and Lawson, Chapell (2003) "An Electorate Adrift?"Public Opinion and the Quality 
of Democracy in Mexico" in  Latin American Research Review. Texas: University Of Texas Press 
 
McCaughan,Michael (1996) "Making  Zapatismo Irreversible" (July1,2006) [Online].-URL: 
http://flag.blackened.net/Revolt/Mexico/Reports/Land_Se96.html 
 
McLean, Iain (1996) The Concise Oxford dictionary of politics.  Oxford : Oxford University Press  
 
Mill, Jon Stewart  (1998) Considerations Of Representative Government (e-book)  The University of 
Adelaide Library (June 3, 2006) [Online].  URL- 
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/ 
 
Mindiola, Omaira (2006)   "Indigenous Governance and Democracy in the Americas" Focal Point 
Spotlight on the Americas  Special Edition, May 2006 :1-2  
 
Moreno Jaimes, Saloie  (2006) " The Challenges of the ‘Politics of Recognition’in Mexico" Focal Point 
Spotlight on the Americas  Special Edition, May 2006 :7-8 
 
Moyo, Sam and Yeros, Paris (2005) Reclaiming the Land: A Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.  London and New York: Zed Books 
 
Nash, June (2001) Mayan Visions: the Quest for Autonomy in an Age of Globalization. London and New 
York: Routledge 
 
Ober J 1989, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People. 
Princeton: Princeton University press 
 
Ober J and C. Hendrick (Edds) 1996, Demokratia : a Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and 
Modern. Princeton: Princeton University press 
 
O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994) "Delegative Democracy?"  Journal of Democracy (June 20, 2006) 
[Online].-URL:http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/172.pdf 
 
O'Donnell, Guillermo  (1993):  "On the State, Democratization  and  Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin 
American View with Glances  at Some  Postcommunist Countries," World Development 21:8  (1993): 
1361.  
 
Ohmae, Kinichi (1995) The  End of  the Nation State. New York: Free Press 
 
O'Malley, Bryan, et.al (1998) "NAFTA- 'A Death Sentence for the Indigenous  People of Mexico'" (June 
21, 2006) [Online].-URL: http://www.providence.edu/polisci/students/zapatistas/nafta.html 
 
Paraneswaran, M.P. (2003) "Participatory Democracy: Two Opposing Views on the Future of 
Humankind."  in Fisher, William S. and Ponniah, Thomas et.al. (2003) Another World Is Possible: 
 101
Popular Alternatives to Globalization At the World Social Forum. Nova Scotia:  Fernwood Publishing 
Ltd   
 
Peeler, John (1998) Building Democracy in Latin America. Boulder and London:  Lynne Rienner 
Publishers  
 
Richard, Rose, Mishler, William, and Haerfer, Chrandistian (1998) Democracy and Its Alternatives: 
Understanding Post-Communist Societies.  Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Rus, Jan et.al (2001) “Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias: Introduction.” Latin  American Perspectives Vol. 28 
No. 2: 7-19 
 
San Andrés Accords, January 18, 1996 (June 05, 2006) [Online].-URL:http://jaguar-
sun.com/chiapas/sanandre.html 
 
Sanders, Jerry W. (2001) "Two Mexico's and Fox's Quandary" The Nation February 26, 2001 (June 25, 
2006) [Online].-URL: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010226/sanders 
 
Saramago,José "Chiapas Land of Hope and Sorrow" Le Monde Diplomatique - March 1999 
(June 20, 2006) [Online].-URL: 
Http://Mondediplo.com/1999/03/08Sarama?Var_Recherche=Chiapas+March1999  
 
Schumpeter, Joseph (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper Perennial.  
 
Sen, Amartya “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Journal of Democracy, 10, 1999. 
 
Shutt, Harry (2001) A New Democracy: Alternatives to a Bankrupt World Order.  London and New York: 
Zed Books 
Shah, Anup "a Primer on Neoliberalism" (July 1, 2006) [Online].-URL: 
Http://www.Globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Neoliberalism.asp 
 
Silverman, David (2004) Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and 
Interaction.  London: SAGE Publications 
 
Simonelli, Jeanne and Earle, Duncan (2005) Uprising of Hope: Sharing the Zapatistas Journey to 
Alternative Development .  New York Altamira Press 
 
Stephen, Lynn (2002) Zapata Lives!  Histories and Cultural Politics in Southern Mexico.  Berkeley: 
University Of California Press 
Subcommandante Marcos (2004) "Reading  a Video,Part  Four:  Four  Fallacies La Jornada, August  23,  
2004,Originally  published in Spanish by the  
EZLN (July Aug. 15, 2005) [Online].-URL: 
http://www.eco.utexas.edu/~hmcleave/20040823VideoPtIV.html 
Subcommandante Marcos (2003) "Chiapas the 13th Stele" 
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=3970 
 102
 
Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos (1997)  "The Seven Loose Pieces of the Global Jigsaw Puzzle, 
Neoliberalism as a puzzle: the useless global unity which  fragments and destroys nations" (July 15, 2006) 
[Online].-URL:http://www.raptorial.com/Zine/Marcos/Marcos0.html 
 
Tamayo-Flores, Rafael (2001)Journal of Latin American Studies (2001), 33: 377-407 Cambridge 
University Press  
 
Tresierra, Julio C. (1994) "Mexico: Indigenous peoples and the Nation-State.  in D. Van  Cott, ed. 
Indigenous peoples and Democracy in Latin  America. New York. St.  Martin's Press.  
 
Vadi, José  M. (2001)  "Economic Globalization,  Class  Struggle, and the Mexican State" Latin American  
Perspectives No. 28: 129-147  
 
Van Der Haar (2005) "Land Reform, the State, and the Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas" The Journal of 
Peasant Studies  Special Issue on Rural Chiapas 10 Years after the Zapatista Uprising Vol.  No.  3-4: 451-
460 
 
Weldon, Jeffrey "The Political Sources of Presidentialismo in Mexico"225-258 in  
Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew Soperg (1997) Presidentialism And Democracy in Latin 
America.  New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
White, Sarah C. (2000) "Depoliticising Development: the Uses and Abuses of Participation" in Eade, 
Deborah and Pierce, Jenny Development, NGO's and Civil Society: Selected  Essays from  Development 
in Practice.Kumarian Pr Inc. 
 
Williamson, Thad et.al (2003) Making the Place for Community, Local Democracy in a Global Era. New 
York and London: Routledge 
 
Woodin, Michael and Lucas, Caroline (2004) of the. London: Pluto Press 
 
Østerud,Øyvind et.al (1997) Statsvitenskapelig Leksikon Universitetsforlaget 
 
Interview sources 
Chiapas NGO Official L. (2006) Personal Interview  
Chiapas NGO Official N. (2006) Personal Interview  
Chiapas State Official: Education Department (2006).  Personal Interview 17th, January 
Eber, Christine San, Cristobal de Las Casas (2006) E-mail interview, 15th, July 
EZLN General Command, Oventic (2006). Personal interview 21st, Jan., 3rd, Feb. 
Fray Bartolome Center for Human Rights-San Cristóbal de Las Casas (2006) Personal interview. 15th Feb. 
JBG, Oventic (2006). Personal Interview 3, March 
JBG, De Garracha (2006).  Personal interview February 
Nash, June (2006) anthropologist/professor/author.  Personal Interview San Cristóbal de Las Casas, 21st, 
 103
January, 3rd March 
Hidalgo, Onesimo (CIEPAC-2006).  Personal interview 19th, January 
Hidalgo, Onesimo (CIEPAC-2006).  E-mail interview  15th, July  
Meneses, Juan Anzaldo Editor for Ce-Acatl Magazine  
Serna, Dr. Jose Moreno(2006) Senior Professor, Latin American Culture Studies,  National Autonomous 
University of Mexico UNAM 
Zapatista citizen E. - male (2006).  Personal interview/informal February 25 
Zapatista citizen G. - female (2006).  Personal interview/informal February 21 
Zapatista citizen J. - female (2006).  Personal interview/informal February 26 
Zapatista citizen V. - male (2006).  Personal interview/informal 20th, Feb. 
Representative from the Women's Artisan cooperative Xulum Chon,Oventic (2006).   
Personal interview 21st, January 
Zapatista Hospital Official Oventic(2006).  Personal interview 21st, January 
Zapatista School Official Oventic (2006).  Personal interview 21st, January 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
 
